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ABSTRACT 
Climate Change in Rural Nevada: The Influence of Vulnerability on Risk 
Perception and Environmental Behavior 
 
by 
Ahmad Saleh Safi 
Dr. William James Smith, Jr., Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Environmental Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 In this research, I examine the impact of vulnerability on risk perception, stated 
willingness to adopt individual mitigation behavior, and support for climate change 
mitigation policies. My major research question is, “Does vulnerability to climate change 
increase risk perception, encourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and 
enhance support for climate change mitigation policies?” But to understand the role of 
vulnerability I also pursue answers to questions regarding its three components: Physical 
vulnerability; sensitivity and adaptive capacity. I investigate the following sub-questions: 
• Do physical vulnerability, and sensitivity to climate change increase risk 
perception, encourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and enhance 
support for climate change mitigation policies?  
• Does greater adaptive capacity to climate change decrease risk perception, 
discourage more energy-efficient individual behavior, and weaken support for 
climate change mitigation policies? 
 The research population is Nevada farmers and ranchers. This research is based 
on my work for a Nevada NSF EPSCoR project titled, “Nevada Infrastructure for Climate 
Change Science, Education and Outreach.” Specifically, my research is a part of the 
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activities of the Policy, Decision Making and Outreach project’s component. Within this 
project, Nevada ranchers and farmers were surveyed in December 2009 and August 2010 
regarding their socioeconomic characteristics and climate change related knowledge, 
beliefs, risk perceptions, environmental behaviors and policy preferences.   
 I utilize the data gathered in that survey in addition to GIS based secondary data 
on water availability and use, and population densities in Nevada. Using the GIS based 
secondary data, I map Water Resource Vulnerability in Nevada to perform an assessment 
of physical vulnerability to climate change. I assess both sensitivity and adaptive capacity 
to climate change using the socioeconomic data collected from the survey. Then, I 
aggregate the three vulnerability components into a composite vulnerability index unique 
to each farmer and rancher. I employ multiple regression analysis to investigate the 
influence of the composite vulnerability index, and its three separate components on risk 
perceptions. I utilize logistic regression to investigate the influence of the composite 
vulnerability index and its components on the willingness to adopt climate change 
mitigation individual actions and support for mitigation policies. 
 The research establishes that vulnerability to climate change is not a significant 
factor in determining risk perception or the willingness to engage in, or support most of 
the climate change mitigation actions or policies. While vulnerable ranchers and farmers 
are more supportive of taking actions mitigating climate change; they are less supportive 
of climate change mitigation polices perceived as being costly including taxing 
corporations and fuel. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In this research, I investigate the influence of physical and socioeconomic 
vulnerabilities to climate change on both risk perception and environmental behavior. 
This research is interdisciplinary, drawing on the literature of risk analysis, 
psychosociology and human geography. The literature lacks studies that investigate the 
impact of the aggregated physical and socioeconomic vulnerabilities to climate change on 
risk perception, willingness to engage in individual mitigation actions and support of 
public mitigation policies (Blake 2001; Messner and Meyer 2006). This dissertation aims 
at filling this research gap, and enriching the discourse concerning the determinants of 
both risk perception and environmental behaviors within the context of climate change.  
 This research is a part of the activities of the Policy, Decision Making, and 
Outreach Component (hereinafter PDOC) of a National Science Foundation funded 
Nevada EPSCoR project, “Nevada Infrastructure for Climate Change Science, Education 
and Outreach” (hereinafter the NV NSF Climate Project). This project funded most of my 
pursuit of a PhD degree. The Nevada NSF Climate Project is funded by both the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and Nevada System of Higher Education (NSHE). The project 
is a $21.5 million, 5 year endeavor that started on September 1, 2008. The researchers at 
PDOC work with the main groups and stakeholders in Nevada including ranchers and 
farmers, Native Americans, students, businesses, and governmental and non-
governmental organizations. A research lab named the Climate Change Research Lab 
was established in 2009 by Dr. William James Smith Jr. at UNLV to host most of the 
researchers and the PDOC research activities.  
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In this chapter, I first introduce my research problem, clarifying its importance for the 
climate change mitigation policy debate in the U.S. Then, I list my research questions and 
place them in the literature.  Finally, I provide a summarized overview of the NV NSF 
Climate Project. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) fourth assessment report 
stated that climate change is “unequivocal” (IPCC 2007a); there is abundant evidence 
that the global average temperature, including both air and ocean temperatures, is 
increasing continuously. Additionally, the report stated that there are indications of 
already accelerating snow and ice melting, and sea level rise at the global scale. The 
IPCC also reported that the global mean surface temperature has increased by 0.74 ± 
0.18oC (1.7 ± 0.3oF) between the years 1906 to 2005. The report stressed the increasing 
confidence regarding the anthropogenic causation behind the accelerating climate 
changes (very likely, 90-99% probability).  
The IPCC (2007a, b) argued that the rise of global temperature interacts with the 
complex climate system to produce varied impacts that differ from region to region and 
ecosystem to ecosystem. For example, some wet areas are expected to become even 
wetter, and thus suffer an increasing flood risk. On the other hand, drought stricken areas 
are expected to have more frequent, longer and severer drought occurrences (IPCC 
2007b). While water supplies are expected to be enhanced at the high latitudes and the 
already-wet tropics, supplies are expected to diminish around the dry regions, mid-
latitudes and dry tropics. Increased local temperatures at mid to high-latitudes may result 
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in slight increase of crop productivity. But, at lower latitudes crop production is projected 
to decrease significantly. Increased sea level rise is expected to intensify the risks of 
flooding and coastal erosion in many coastal areas.  
Increased water stress, severer and more frequent extreme events, decreased crop 
production, and raised temperature are all expected to inflict serious health and economic 
impacts on many areas around the world (IPCC 2007b). According to the WHO, the 
annual climate change death toll has already reached 150,000 deaths in 2000, (WHO 
2003; Broome 2008, Miller 2010). A more recent study by the Global Humanitarian 
Forum estimated the climate change imposed death in 2009 to be 300,000 (GHF 2009). 
Rajan (2006) argued that for the atmospheric concentration of the greenhouse 
gases to stabilize at 450 ppm, the U.S. may have to reduce its contemporary emissions by 
75% by 2050. According to the IPCC (2007c), stabilizing the atmospheric greenhouse 
gases concentration at 445-490 ppm CO2 equivalent (CO2-eq) leads to a global mean 
temperature rise of 2-2.4oC (3.6-4.3oF) by the end of the 21st century. While, a 
concentration of 535-590 ppm CO2-eq leads to a temperature rise of 2.8-3.2oC (5.0-
5.8oF). And, an atmospheric greenhouse gases concentration of 590-710 CO2-eq leads to 
global mean temperature increase of 3.2-4oC (5.8-7.2oF).   
However, the U.S. greenhouse gas emissions continued to grow from about 4,735 
million metric tons of carbon dioxide in 1980 to 5,999.90 metric tons in 2007 (U.S. 
Energy Information Administration 2009). Figure 1-1 shows that both the transportation 
and residential sectors add up to about 61% of the total U.S. carbon dioxide emissions. 
Rajan (2006) stated that about 75% of the transportation sector emissions result from the 
passenger transportation sector, while the remainder results from freight. 
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Figure 1-1: 2007, U.S. CO2 emissions per sector in million metric tons.  
Source: Created from US. Energy Information Administration 2009. 
Note: CO2 emissions from the electricity sector are allocated to the energy consumption 
sectors in proportion to each sector share of the total electricity retail sale. 
 
Bandivadekar and Heywood (2004); Evans (2008) argued that in order to 
decrease the greenhouse emissions from the transportation sector, citizens need to alter 
their vehicle-use habits and support the governmental adoption of more strict fuel 
efficiency regulations. For example, Bandivadekar and Heywood (2004) showed that 
regulating the vehicles fuel efficiency alone cannot lead to decreased greenhouse 
emissions. They stated that the U.S. Congress enacted the Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards (CAFÉ) in 1975. This regulation succeeded in increasing the fuel 
efficiency of light cars by about 56% between 1973 and 1979.  In 1980, this increase of 
efficiency stopped at 9.8 L/100km (24mpg) for light cars, and13.7 L/100km (17.2 mpg) 
for light trucks. However, this rise in fuel efficiency was overshadowed by the growth of 
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car ownership rate (800 vehicles per 1000 people), the upturn of less efficient light trucks 
sales (from 18% to 50% in 2004) and the doubling of vehicles kilometer (miles) traveled.  
Decreasing emissions from the residential and commercial sectors requires more 
voluntary actions from the side of citizens. The IPCC (2007c) reported that the residential 
and commercial building sector offers a cost effective greenhouse gases emissions 
reduction potential of 30% of the projected 2020 baseline emissions using existing 
technologies. These reductions can be attained by a wide spectrum of activities ranging 
from no cost energy saving activities such as turning the unnecessary lights off, or using a 
thermostat to control the air conditioning temperature, to cost effective installation of 
more energy efficient heaters, refrigerators and other house appliances, to utilizing better 
designs for effective insulation, solar panels, passive cooling and natural ventilation.  
Although awareness of climate change and its impacts has been rising since the 
1980s, the U.S. public support of mitigation strategies perceived as being costly has 
continued to be limited (Leiserowitz 2003; Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 
2009). In 1989, only 70% of Americans believed that climate change was a serious issue, 
while in 2003, this percentage rose to 92% (Leiserowitz 2003). However, O’Conner, 
Bord and Fisher (1999) reported that by the end of the 20th century, a good majority of 
Americans were willing to choose more fuel efficient cars (63%), and replace energy 
wasteful appliances (75%), but a moderate majority (55%) were willing to support 
governmental legislation that add taxes on extremely inefficient automobiles (gas 
guzzlers). Only a small minority (18%) were willing to support taxing gasoline or taxing 
businesses (38%). In 2008, Leiserowitz, Maibach and Roser-Renouf (2009) reported a 
similar trend; only 33% of Americans supported taxing gasoline. But, a good majority 
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supported less costly policies such as increasing vehicles fuel efficiency to 45 mpg 
(79%), subsidizing energy efficient appliances (72%), and increasing use of renewable 
energy by electric utilities (72%). And, a vast majority (92%) supported increasing of the 
governmental funding to research on renewable energy resources.  
In the last two years, some regression in the public’s belief in climate change as 
an anthropogenic problem, as well as a decrease in the evaluation of its risk have been 
noticed. For example, in 2010, only 57% of the American adults believed climate change 
is happening, in comparison to 71% in 2008. And, only 53% believed that climate change 
has an anthropogenic trigger (completely or partially) in 2010, compared to 62% in 2008. 
Additionally, the percentage of Americans who think that the people in the U.S. are being 
harmed now by climate change decreased from 34% in 2008 to 25% in 2010, while the 
percentage of Americans who think that the U.S. will never be harmed increased from 
15% in 2008 to 23% in 2010 (Leiserowitz, Maibach, and Roser-Renouf 2010). 
While the impacts of climate change continue to reveal themselves over time, the 
need for the U.S citizens to significantly reduce their greenhouse gases emissions 
becomes greater. Such reduction imposes the need for serious changes in the citizens’ 
energy use habits coupled with effective public climate change mitigation policies. 
Accordingly, understanding the determinants of climate change related risk perception 
and environmental behavior among the U.S. citizens is crucial for productive 
communication among citizens, scientists, and policy makers on the way to 
comprehensive climate change mitigation plans. Tremendous research has been 
conducted to investigate the determinants of risk perception and environmental behavior 
within the context of climate change. My research adds to this work by investigating the 
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impact of vulnerability to climate change on both risk perception and environmental 
behavior. As a part of the Nevada NSF Climate Project, this research endeavors to 
provide both the policy makers and the climate change scientists with knowledge that 
will assist them in engaging in more effective communication and interaction in the 
“public sphere” on the way towards informed and educated public decisions regarding 
climate change mitigation (Habermas 1989).    
 
1.2 Research Questions 
My research examines whether vulnerability to climate change affects 
individuals’ perceptions regarding the impacts of climate change, decisions to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as their support of public policies intended to mitigate 
climate change. Specifically, I evaluate how differences in individual vulnerabilities to 
the risk of climate change induced drought among Nevada ranchers and farmers influence 
their risk perceptions willingness to adopt and/or accept individual mitigation actions 
and/or support public mitigation policies.  
1.2.1 Key Definitions 
In this subsection, I introduce some of the most important concepts utilized in this 
research. These definitions help develop a common understanding of the major 
components of this research, and avoid possible confusion with other interpretations of 
these terms or concepts. In this research I use the definition of vulnerability stated by the 
IPCC (2001, p. 995) which is: 
…the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, 
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
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extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity, and its 
adaptive capacity (IPCC 2001, p. 995).  
 
Sensitivity is a measure of the extent to which a system can be harmed or benefit 
by a given hazard; whereas, adaptive capacity reflects the capacity of a system to 
mitigate, survive, adjust, take advantage of, and adapt to environmental hazards (Fussel 
and Klein  2006; Smit and Wandal 2006; Metzger, Leemans and Schroter 2005; Gallopin 
2006). 
Risk perception pertains to the lay persons’ appreciation (ranking) of the 
probability and magnitude of certain hazards on certain groups such as oneself, family, or 
community (Slovic et al. 1982; Fischhof 1995; Sjoberg 2000). It also relates to the lay 
persons’ perception regarding the imminence of given risks.  
Environmental behavior is identified as any behavior that impacts the 
environment (Stern 2000). Stern et al. (1999) classified environmental behaviors into 
three categories: 1) Environmental activism; 2) Non-activist behaviors in the public 
sphere; and 3) Private-sphere environmentalism. Environmental activism includes 
involvement in environmental organizations or participation in pro-environmental 
activities such as demonstrations and campaigning. Non-activist behaviors in the public 
sphere include supporting environmental policies, petitioning and willingness to pay 
higher taxes for the sake of the environment. Private sphere environmentalism includes 
engaging in activities at the personal level that have positive impact on the environment, 
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such as recycling, conserving water and energy, and purchasing environmental friendly 
goods.  
1.2.2 Questions  
This interdisciplinary research project draws on the literature of three knowledge 
domains including vulnerability, risk perception, and environmental behavior, all of 
which intersect with climate change policy discourse. More specifically, this research 
focuses on non-activist behaviors both in the public and private spheres.  The research 
adds to the literature investigating the impact of vulnerability on risk perceptions and 
environmental behavior. In this research, I assess vulnerability as a composite factor of 
the following components: 1) Physical vulnerability; 2) sensitivity; and 3) adaptive 
capacity of Nevada farmers and ranchers. Then, I investigate the impact of vulnerability 
on ranchers’ and farmers’ climate change risk perception, decisions to engage in pro-
environmental individual actions or support climate change public policies. I also 
investigate the impacts of the three components of vulnerability as independent 
determinants of Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perceptions and environmental 
behaviors. My research questions are:  
1.  Does vulnerability increase risk perception?  
a. Does physical vulnerability increase risk perception? 
b. Does sensitivity increase risk perception? 
c. Does higher adaptive capacity decrease risk perception? 
2. Does vulnerability lead to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions? 
a. Does physical vulnerability lead to willingness to adopt individual actions? 
b. Does sensitivity lead to willingness to adopt individual actions? 
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c. Does higher adaptive capacity decrease willingness to adopt mitigation 
actions? 
3. Does vulnerability lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies?  
a. Does physical vulnerability lead to supporting public mitigation policies? 
b. Does sensitivity lead to supporting public mitigation policies? 
c. Does adaptive capacity decrease supporting public mitigation policies? 
 
1.2.3 Place in the Literature 
Within the context of climate change, few studies have focused on the 
interrelationships between vulnerability, risk perception, willingness to engage in 
individual mitigation actions and support of public mitigation policies (Blake 2001; 
Messner and Meyer 2006). Satterfield, Mertz and Slovic (2004) argued that the lack of 
focus on investigating the interrelationship between vulnerability, risk perception, and 
environmental behavior results from the disparity between the disciplines within which 
these research domains exist. In this research I bridge this gap through investigating the 
interaction of vulnerability and its three components with both risk perception and 
environmental behavior. The study of vulnerability is prominent within the disciplines of 
geography and environmental sciences, whereas risk perception and environmental 
behavior research are prominent within the disciplines of risk analysis and social 
psychology (Blake 2001; Messner and Meyer 2006). 
Brody et al. (2008) investigated the impacts of different physical vulnerabilities 
on climate change risk perception. The researchers found that those who live closer to the 
coastline and at lower elevations perceived the risk of climate change higher than those 
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who live at higher elevations or farther from the coastline. People living in areas with 
higher natural-hazards-imposed fatalities also perceive climate change risk higher than 
those living in less exposed areas. On the other side of the spectrum, people who live 
within the 100-year flood plain perceived climate change perceive lower than those who 
live in safer areas. People living in areas witnessing increasing wildfires or number of 
days exceeding average temperature or higher natural hazards economic losses perceive 
climate change the same as others.  
Working with the same sample as in Brody et al. (2008), Zahran et al. (2006) 
investigated the influence of physical vulnerability to climate change impacts on 
willingness to assume costlier mitigation policies. The authors reached mixed 
conclusions. They found that people living in areas experiencing significant increase in 
the summer temperature or higher natural hazard causality are more supportive to climate 
change mitigation policies. But, those people who live closer to the coastline (1 mile 
radius), thus more susceptible to the risk of inundation are less willing to support climate 
change mitigation policies. 
As can be seen above, only a limited number of studies investigated the impact of 
vulnerability on risk perception especially in relation to climate change. Even this limited 
number of studies investigated vulnerability, focusing only on the physical vulnerability 
component and neglecting the interaction between the physical vulnerability and the 
socioeconomic conditions of exposed individuals that determine their final vulnerability 
to climate change impacts. Investigating the physical component in vulnerability alone 
may lead to incomplete appreciation of the impact of vulnerability on either climate 
change related risk perception or environmental behavior. For example, in the case of 
 12
those who are living close to the coastline the number of houses owned by every resident, 
her/his income, number of months spent at the beach house, and reasons behind living 
near the coast provide important insights on those people perceptions and opinions in 
relation to climate change. Additionally, if the beach residents believed that discussing 
climate change affect the value of their property, they may find the whole climate change 
discussion to be a threat to their investments and economic interests. 
This research enriches such discussion and widens the focus of assessing 
vulnerability to include both social vulnerability (sensitivity and adaptive capacity) and 
physical vulnerability. Additionally, this study utilizes a different strategy; instead of 
studying a sample representing the general population, this research focuses on one group 
(ranchers and farmers) that shares common interests and challenges in regard to climate 
change impacts. Using this strategy eliminates or limits the impact of variation among 
individuals regarding the importance and value of the same natural resource or hazard of 
concern. Also, studying the impact of vulnerability and its component allows for better 
understanding of how each component of vulnerability behaves within the context of 
climate change risk perception and environmental behavior and how they interact with 
each other to formulate the overarching influence of vulnerability on determining 
peoples’ risk perception and behavior.  
 
1.3 Nevada NSF Climate Project’s Overview 
This research is nested within the activities of the Policy Decision Making and 
Outreach Component of the Nevada NSF Climate Project. The Nevada NSF Climate 
Project aims at building the science, education and outreach infrastructure for the study of 
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climate change among NSHE universities and colleges, including the University of 
Nevada-Las Vegas (UNLV), University of Nevada-Reno (UNR), Desert Research 
Institute (DRI), and Nevada State Colleges (NSC) (NSF EPSCoR 2008).  
The NV NSF Climate Project encompasses six components: Policy, Decision 
Making and Outreach; Climate Modeling; Ecological Change; Water Resources; Cyber-
infrastructure; and Education (Figure 1-2). The goal of the Policy, Decision Making and 
Outreach component is to “develop data collection, modeling and visualization tools to 
better understand institutional and societal aspects of climate change and perform 
outreach to translate and communicate this [climate change] science” (NSF EPSCoR 
2008,  p.10). The Climate Modeling component works on downscaling global climate 
models to assess the regional climate variability in Nevada with higher resolution and 
over shorter time periods. The Ecological Change component is investigating and 
modeling climate change impacts on the major ecosystems and echo-hydrologic 
processes in Nevada. The Water Resources component is quantitatively assessing and 
modeling the interaction between climate change and Nevada water cycles and resources. 
The Cyber-infrastructure component is assisting all the other components through 
providing and maintaining the computing, storage and visualization infrastructure. The 
Education component is focusing on building the needed infrastructure for educating and 
training k-12 teachers and NSHE undergraduate students as climate change teachers and 
researchers (NSF EPSCoR 2008). 
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Figure 1-2: The structure of the NV NSF Climate Project. 
Source: The NV NSF Climate Project team. 
 
The Policy, Decision Making and Outreach component (PDOC) is working on 
achieving three main objectives. The first objective is to research the climate change 
related knowledge, perceptions, and policy preferences among different Nevada 
communities, groups and stakeholders: Ranchers and farmers; Native Americans; 
university students; small businesses; and governmental and nongovernmental 
stakeholders (NSF EPSCoR 2008). The second objective is to perform outreach with the 
above listed groups in a way that enhances opportunities for two-way communication 
between the NV NSF Climate Project scientists and Nevada communities and 
stakeholders. The last objective is to develop visualization and media tools and messages 
that allow effective communication between the different climate change stakeholders 
and decision makers in Nevada.  
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To enhance two-way communications between the NV NSF Climate Project’s 
researchers and Nevada communities and stakeholders, a Social Science Climate Change 
Network (SSCCN) was formed. The network consists of the project’s social scientists 
from the three NSHE institutions (UNLV, UNR and DRI) and a Stakeholder Advisory 
Committee (SAC). The basic role of the SAC is to address varying sub-community 
priorities and feedbacks while discussing scientific questions and research results. The 
SAC concept is also helpful in providing the understanding of the scientific approaches 
needed for effective communication of the Nevada NSF Climate Project outputs to the 
stakeholders (NSF EPSCOR 2008).  
The outcomes of the research activities of the PDOC, regarding the determinants 
of Nevadans climate change knowledge, risk perception and policy support will be 
utilized as guidelines for proper communication of climate change project outputs of both 
a science and social science nature to Nevada policy makers, and stakeholders. The NV 
NSF Climate Project will make its data available through a climate change data portal, 
and visualization cyber-infrastructure that taps the GIS and Remote sensing facilities of 
the NSHE universities.  Additionally the PDOC will produce videos and new media on 
climate change in Nevada in both English and Spanish suitable for the general public 
awareness and knowledge building. In the last year of the project (2012), PDOC will 
organize a national conference on climate change and policy with an emphasis on arid 
environment using research from the NV NSF Climate Project and research throughout 
the U.S. (NSF EPSCoR 2008).   
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CHAPTER 2 
STATE OF LITERATURE 
My research draws heavily on literature from three main research areas: 1) Risk 
perception, 2) environmental behavior and 3) vulnerability. Throughout this chapter, I 
provide a review of the literature on risk perception, environmental behavior, and 
vulnerability within the context of climate change. Firstly, I provide a review on the 
evolution of the concept of vulnerability to natural and technical hazards. Then, I 
summarize the literature on the determinants of risk perception and environmental 
behavior within the context of climate change.  
 
2.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change 
In my research I adopt vulnerability to climate change as a function of three main 
components: 1) physical vulnerability; 2) sensitivity; and 3) adaptive capacity. While 
physical vulnerability (P.V.) of a particular system (community, individuals) is 
determined by the probability and severity of certain hazards (natural or technological) 
affecting this system, both sensitivity and adaptive capacity are determined by the 
socioeconomic conditions of the threatened communities or individuals (Turner et al. 
2003; Cutter 2003; Adger 2006; IPCC 2007b, Smith Jr. 2008).  
 Researchers from different knowledge domains have been involved in a 
discourse on what constitutes vulnerability to hazards since at least the 1960s. Within this 
discourse, vulnerability evolved from being centered on the probability and severity of 
hazards to take place (physical vulnerability) and became an umbrella concept in which 
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both physical vulnerability and the socioeconomic conditions of the threatened individual 
or communities are linked. 
 The discussion concerning vulnerability has been taking place within different 
knowledge domains resulting in three different definitions, attributes and focal questions 
(Table 2.1). Janssen (2007) conducted a bibliometric analysis of 3,399 publications 
issued between 1967 and 2007 on three knowledge domains: Vulnerability (1,534 
studies); adaptation (1,033 studies); and resilience (1,559). Some publications were 
classified into more than one knowledge domain. The research revealed that while the 
ecological resilience knowledge domain is rooted in ecology and mathematics, the 
vulnerability and adaptation domains are rooted in geography and natural hazards 
research. Janssen found that the research activity in the three domains increased 
substantially after 1992 as a result of the extensive research on climate change impacts on 
both the ecological and human systems. The researchers also established that the 
connection between vulnerability and adaptation knowledge domains on one side, and the 
resilience knowledge domain on another continued to be weak till recently in terms of co-
authorship and citations. 
Cutter (1996), Eakin and Luers (2006) and Fussel (2007) argued that even within 
the geography and natural hazards research, there are two separate approaches to define 
and assess vulnerability especially within the context of climate change. As can be seen 
in Table 2-1, the first approach is the risk hazard approach mostly used by engineers and 
economists. This approach focuses on predicting the physical impacts of climate change 
on the physical environment and the human systems. The other approach is the political 
economy approach, which focuses on the ability of humans as individuals or 
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communities to avoid, cope with, and adapt to hazards that threaten their livelihood and 
wellbeing.  
 
 
Table 2-1: The Three Conceptual Lineages of Contemporary Vulnerability Research. 
Point of 
Comparison 
Risk/Hazard Political Economy Ecological Resilience 
Focal Questions  What are hazards? 
What are the 
impacts? 
Where and when? 
How are people and places 
affected differently? 
What explains differential 
capacities to cope and 
adapt? 
What are the causes and 
consequences of 
differential susceptibility? 
What and how do 
systems change? 
What is the capacity to 
respond to change? 
What are the 
underlying processes 
that control the ability 
to cope or adapt?   
Key Attributes Exposure (physical 
threat, external to 
systems), Se 
Capacity, households, 
social groups, 
communities, livelihoods 
Ecosystem, coupled 
human environmental 
systems 
Exposure Unit Places, sectors, 
activities, landscapes, 
regions. 
Individuals, households, 
social groups, 
communities, livelihoods 
Ecosystems, coupled 
human-environmental 
systems 
Decision Scale of 
Assessment  
Regional, global Local Regional, global Landscape, ecoregions, 
multiplescales  
Selected Definitions “ .. the likelihood that 
an individual or a 
group will be 
exposed to and 
adversely affected by 
a hazard. It is the 
interaction of the 
hazards place with 
the social profile of 
communities”(Cutter 
1996 p. 532) 
 
“.. the idea of 
potential for negative 
consequences which 
are difficult to 
ameliorate through 
adaptive measures 
given the range of 
possible climate 
changes that might 
reasonably occur”  
IPCC, 2001, P 774) 
“ The characteristic of a 
person or persons in term 
of their capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, 
resist and recover from the 
impact of natural hazards” 
(Blaikie, Cannon, Davis 
and Wisner 1994, p 9) 
 
“Vulnerability comes at 
the confluence of 
underdevelopment, social 
and economic marginality, 
and the inability to garner 
sufficient resources to 
maintain the natural-
resource base and to cope 
with the climatological 
and ecological instabilities 
of semi-arid zones.” 
(Ribot, Najam and Watson 
1996, p .28)  
Vulnerability defines 
as the opposite of 
resilience, where 
resilience is “the 
capacity of a system to 
undergo disturbance 
and maintain its 
functions and 
controls.” (Gunderson 
and Holling 2002; 
Carpenter et al. 2001, 
p. 766). 
 
“ Resilience has the 
following three 
properties: a) the 
amount of change a 
system can undergo; b) 
the degree to which the 
system is capable of 
self-organization; c) 
the degree to which the 
system can build the 
capacity to learn and 
adapt” (Carpenter, et 
al. 2001, p. 766) 
Source: Adopted from Eakin and Luers (2006, p.368). 
 19
The few studies that investigated the impact of vulnerability on risk perception 
and environmental behavior within the context of climate change adopted the risk hazard 
approach focusing on the physical impacts of climate change without considering the 
socioeconomic conditions of threatened communities. Adger (1999); Kelly and Adger 
(2000) argued that the study of physical vulnerability alone deals with natural hazards 
such as the impacts of climate change as if they happen in vacuum. They further argued 
that when natural hazards affect a group of people, they interact with the socioeconomic 
conditions of those people. This either enhances and deepens their vulnerability, or 
decreases the impacts of the natural hazards and strengthens these people’s adaptive 
capacity. Kelly and Adger’s (2000) understanding of vulnerability assessment applies 
what they called the “wounded soldier” approach. The wounded soldier approach focuses 
on assessing the impact of the existing conditions (injury) on the capacity of systems 
(individuals or groups) to avoid, cope with and adapt to expected hazards or risks. 
Bohle, Downing and Watts (1994); Adger and Kelly (1999) argued that the 
interaction between natural hazards as external factors and the socioeconomic conditions 
of the affected human systems is based on the “architecture of entitlement.” The 
architecture of entitlement is a theory developed within the research on famine insecurity. 
They explained that, the resources available for any human system (individuals, 
communities, sectors, and nations), and the entitlement of the members of those human 
systems to such resources determine the ability of those systems to survive and adapt to 
external stresses and hazards. Entitlement in this sense is not limited to the availability of 
resources such as income and wealth, but it extends to include culture, efficiency of 
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informal institutions, effectiveness of formal institutions, and distribution of political 
power that determine the accessibility to resources at the time of stress. 
Currently, a growing body of literature integrates the physical vulnerability or 
exposure to hazards and risks, and the socioeconomic conditions or the social 
vulnerability within an overarching vulnerability definition (Turner et al. 2003; Cutter 
2003; Adger 2006; IPCC 2007b, Smith Jr. 2008). The IPCC (2001 p. 995) defined 
vulnerability to climate change as: 
…the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, 
adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and 
extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of 
climate variation to which a system is exposed, its Sensitivity, and its 
Adaptive Capacity. 
 
2.1.1 Sensitivity 
Sensitivity (hereinafter Se) is a measure of the extent to which a system can be 
harmed or benefit by a given hazard. In this sense, Se denotes those characteristics of a 
system that govern the outputs of its interaction with a given hazard when it takes place. 
For example, characteristics such as age determine Se to heat waves as children and 
elderly are more sensitive than youth. In other cases, the level of reliance on natural 
resources such as water and forests determines communities’ and individuals’ Se to 
certain climate change impacts such as drought, soil erosion, and wildfires. For example, 
those communities which depend more on agriculture for their economic wellbeing are 
more sensitive to climate change impacts such as drought and crop production decrease 
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than communities with more diverse economies (Scheraga and Grambsch 1998; 
Kasperson and Kasperson 2001; Fussel and Klein 2006; O’Brien et al. 2006).  
Consequently, For Nevada farmers and ranchers diversification of income is an 
important factor of determining the sensitivity of their livelihood to drought as those who 
are less reliant on agriculture as a source of income are less sensitive to drought than 
others. Additionally, those farmers and ranchers who diversify their agricultural income 
more through practicing more than one agricultural activity (ranching, farming, 
beekeeping, aquaculture, etc.) are less sensitive than those who practice only one activity. 
Practicing more than one agricultural activity provide choices for the agricultural 
practitioner at times of exposure to drought, unavailable for those who rely completely on 
one activity. Also, diversification of crops and domestic animals is another factor of 
importance when it comes to farmers’ and ranchers’ Se to climate change imposed 
drought, as those with higher crop and animal diversification are in better state to survive 
severe drought conditions, for example, by giving up these crops or animals with higher 
water demand, than those who are reliant on only few crops or domestic animals for their 
agricultural income. 
2.1.2 Adaptive capacity 
Adaptive capacity (hereinafter Ad.C.) is a measure of the capacity of a system to 
respond to a given environmental hazard by mitigation, coping, survival, adjustment, or 
adaptation. In this sense, Ad.C. relates to the notion of the architecture of entitlement 
discussed above by Bohle, Downing, and Watts (1994); Adger and Kelly (1999). Ad.C. 
reflects the resources available to the system under investigation (community, 
individuals, etc) and the accessibility to these resources when risks take place. Individuals 
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with higher income, higher education and better social status are usually more able to 
protect themselves from or adapt to hazards than those with less resources and political 
connections. At the community level, factors such as wealth, availability of resources, 
efficiency of governmental and nongovernmental institutions, education of citizens 
(human capital), and ability of the community members to gather their resources and 
respond collectively to hazards (social capital) are all decisive regarding the capacity of 
communities to avoid, cope with and adapt to hazards and changes (Yohe and Tol 2002; 
Fussel and Klein  2006; Smit and Wandal 2006; Metzger, Leemans and Schroter 2005; 
Gallopin 2006; Barnett and Adger 2007). 
Adger (2005; 2003; 2000; 1999); Kelly and Adger (2001) stressed that even 
though the individual and social vulnerabilities at the community, society or national 
scales are intrinsically linked, they still have distinct natures. They also stressed the 
improperness of aggregating individual vulnerabilities as assessment of collective 
vulnerability. They argued that at the individual level vulnerability is a function of 
relative poverty, social status, diversity of income, and reliance on natural resources for 
livelihood. As can be seen in Table 2-2, Cutter, Boruff and Shirely (2003) added gender, 
ethnicity, age, household ownership, family size and health status as important factors of 
individual vulnerability. In addition to the aggregated individual vulnerability indicators 
stated before, societal vulnerability encompasses the status of available infrastructure and 
technologies, informal social reciprocity and solidarity norms (social capital), the 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions efficiency, the market structure, and the 
status of formal social security arrangements (i.e. insurance).  
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Table 2-2: Individual and Societal Socioeconomic Vulnerability Matrix. 
General 
Factors 
Description Category 
(Se/Ad.C.) 
In
di
vi
du
al
 V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y 
Poverty Richer individuals are usually more capable to absorb hazards 
impacts than poorer persons (poverty is a function of income and 
dependency ration). 
Ad.C. 
Social Status Those who enjoy higher social status are more resilient because 
they are entitled to more individual and social resources that enable 
them avoid, adopt and recover faster from hazards impacts. Social 
status is a function of income, occupations and education. 
Ad.C. 
Dependence 
on Natural 
Resources 
Those individuals who are dependent on natural resources for their 
livelihood such as fishermen, hunters, gatherers and farmers are 
usually more vulnerable to natural hazards. 
Se  
Diversity of 
Income 
People with more than one source of income are less sensitive to 
absorbing livelihood threatening shocks than those with one source 
of income. 
Se 
Age Elderly and children are usually more vulnerable to extremes such 
as floods, storms, and heat waves. 
Se  
Gender Women usually have a slower recovery time than men because of 
their family care responsibilities, unjust working conditions and 
stricter constraints on mobility and responses to hazards.  
Se  
Race and 
Ethnicity 
Minorities usually have less power and more difficulty to accessing 
post-disaster help. Also they usually live in more hazardous areas. 
Se  
House 
Ownership 
Those who rent are either transient or poor, which limit their 
knowledge about aid sources at the time of emergencies. Also they 
tend to lack sufficient shelter when lodging becomes uninhabitable  
Se  
So
ci
et
al
 V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
y 
Infrastructure 
and 
Technologies 
The value, quality and density of domestic infrastructure and 
technologies that predict, prevent and/or alleviate possible impacts, 
or fasten recovery  
Ad.C. 
Social 
Capital 
The stronger the cultural norms of reciprocity and solidarity in a 
certain community, the more resilient that community is to natural 
hazards, and the faster its (the community) post-hazard recovery is. 
Ad.C. 
Institutional 
Capacity 
The more efficient the institutions the more able they are to predict, 
mitigate and adapt to natural hazards and help affected 
communities recover from hazards. 
Ad.C.  
Market 
Structure 
The value, quality and density of commercial and industrial 
activities determine the societal economic health and thus its level 
of resilience to natural hazards. 
Ad.C.  
Population 
Growth 
Fast population growth put societies under huge stress, providing 
the needed infrastructure and service networks, thus makes such 
societies unable to absorb external natural shocks. 
Se  
Medical 
Services 
The quantity and quality of health institutions are very decisive to 
the capacity of societies to mitigate, and deal with natural extremes 
such as floods, heat waves, epidemics, etc.  
Ad.C.  
Special 
Needs 
populations 
The more special needs groups such as peoples with disabilities, 
chronically diseased, homeless and transient peoples are in a 
community, the more sensitive that community is to natural 
hazards because of the invisibility of those groups during recovery. 
Se  
Insurance Countries with more effective, widespread insurance policies are 
more capable to pool the cost of natural hazards and thus coping 
with them. 
Ad.C. 
Water 
Accessibility 
The percentage of household connected to the water network, the 
amount of water stored at any point of time, the percentage of 
population dependent on natural water resources, the percentage of 
population without consistent water supply in a community are all 
Se  
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decisive to the capacity of that community to deal with 
emergencies such as storms, earthquakes and tornados. 
Food 
Accessibility 
 
Crops diversity, dependence on family farms or natural resources 
for food, and the availability of food affect communities’ capacity 
to deal with droughts and natural extremes. 
Se  
Sources: Cutter, Boruff and Shirley (2003); Kelly and Adger (2000); Adger (2005, 2003, 2000, 1999); 
Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009). 
 
In contrast to previous research that focused on the impact of P.V. to climate 
change on risk perception and individual behavior, my research study vulnerability as an 
integrated function of P.V., Se and Ad.C. I use variations in water stress in Nevada as a 
proxy for the physical vulnerability component (see the methodology chapter). I use the 
level of reliance on agricultural income for livelihood (the share of agricultural income/ 
the total family income) as an indicator of Se to drought among the ranchers and farmers. 
I use both the relative poverty and social status indices as proxies to Ad.C. Finally, I use 
all these indices to develop a vulnerability index for Nevada ranchers and farmers based 
on the work of Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009). 
 
2.2 Climate Change: Risk Perception and Environmental Behavior 
Stern (2000) provided a framework for understanding pro-environmental 
behaviors. He classified the motives behind such behaviors into four categories (Table 2-
3):1) Attitudinal; 2) contextual; 3) personal capacity; and 4) habitual. Attitudinal motives 
include values, beliefs, and ecological worldviews. Moreover, attitudinal motives 
includes beliefs about oneself such as the perception of oneself as responsible of the 
environmental issue of concern (perceived responsibility), or the perception of oneself as 
being able to induce change (perceived self-efficacy).  
Contextual motives include two subcategories: The interpersonal influences and 
physical context. Interpersonal influences include community expectations, governmental 
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policies, social networks, and other legal commitments. Physical contexts include costs 
and benefits of environmental behaviors, and appropriateness of existing regulations, 
infrastructure and technologies. Personal capacity attributes include knowledge regarding 
the environmental issue of concern, and personal attributes such age, gender, education, 
and income. Finally, the habitual motives category includes interactions between 
environmental behaviors and people’s routines. 
 
Table 2-3:  Determinants of Environmental Behavior. 
Category of Motives Components Definitions 
Attitudinal Motives Values The values people attach to targets such as oneself, people 
and community, and the environment. People usually assign 
values to all those targets but in different proportions. 
Beliefs “Conviction that certain things are true.”( Agnes and Laird 
2002, p.55) These Convictions entail almost everything 
starting from oneself, others, God, society, governance, 
science, environment, etc. 
Beliefs about 
oneself 
This component includes both perceived self-efficacy and 
self-responsibility. Perceived self-responsibility implies the 
person’s belief that she/he is responsible for the issue of 
concern; whereas, perceived self-efficacy denotes the 
perception of oneself as capable of averting the 
environmental hazard of concern. 
Ecological 
worldviews 
A special substructure of beliefs concerned mainly with the 
relationships between human beings and their environment 
as ecosystems or species. Environmental beliefs encompass 
but are not limited to the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP), 
Human Exceptionalism Paradigm, or the Dominant 
Western Worldview. 
Contextual Motives Interpersonal 
influences 
Community expectations, social norms, governmental 
policies, social networks, and other legal commitments. 
Physical 
contexts 
The physical environment including natural and human 
made structures, technologies and infrastructure. 
Personal Capacity  Knowledge The awareness regarding the environmental issues of 
concern in terms of its causes and impacts on humans and 
ecosystems. 
Demographic 
Variables 
Education, income, age, gender, race, and place of living. 
Habitual Motives  People routinely do certain behaviors that impact the 
environment such as transportation use and smoking. 
Sources: Dietz (1994); Schwartz (1977); Rajarz (1999); Agnes and Laird (2002); Gardner and Stern 
(1996); Stern 2000; Steg, Derijerink and Abrahamse (2005); Abrahamse et al. (2005); Biel and 
Thogerson (2007). 
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Stern (2000) provided the ABC Theory to describe the interrelationships between 
the different categories of motives described above. The ABC Theory postulates that the 
attitudinal variables (A) including both values and beliefs interact with contextual 
conditions (C) to formulate environmental behaviors (B). As can be seen in Figure 2-1, 
the theory suggests that values (biospherism, egoism and altruism) impact the adoption of 
environmental beliefs regarding nature and its interaction with human. In turn, 
environmental beliefs affect peoples’ awareness of the adverse impacts of environmental 
problems such as air pollution, climate change, etc. This awareness interacts with the 
perceived self-efficacy or self-responsibility to determine the intention to conduct 
aforementioned pro-environmental behaviors (pro-environmental norms). Moreover, the 
theory specifies that the translation of this intention into an environmental behavior is 
mediated by contextual conditions that either facilitate or suppress pro-environmental 
actions.  
 
 Figure 2-1: A schematic presentation of the ABC theory.  
 Source: Created from Stern et al. (1999); Stern (2000). 
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2.2.1 Attitudinal Motives 
Stern and Dietz (1994) identified three types of values related to the discussion on 
risk perception and environmental behavior: 1) Egoistic; 2) altruistic; and 3) biospheric 
values. Egoistic values make people interested in those risks that impact them personally, 
whereas altruistic values make people interested in those risks that impact their families, 
communities and societies. On the other hand, biospheric values make people concerned 
about risks that impact nature, animals and ecosystems. The three values exist in all 
human beings, but to varying degrees. Consequently, people with stronger egoistic 
orientation tend to engage in environmental behaviors that benefit them directly, and 
oppose others if the personal cost is high; whereas, people with stronger altruistic 
orientation would engage in environmental behaviors that avert risks threatening their 
families, communities and societies. People with stronger biospheric orientation would 
engage in environmental behaviors if the given environmental problem threatens nature, 
its ecosystem and species (Stern and Dietz 1994).  
Kahan et al. (2007) argued that the variance among individuals and groups in 
relation to risk perceptions results from a “motivated cognition” which people utilize to 
defend their identity, and societal roles, taking the shape of conflicting worldviews. 
Motivated cognition refers to the tendency of people to distort facts, serving their beliefs 
and worldviews or “believing what they want to believe” (Jost et al. 2003 p. 340). The 
authors employed the Douglas (1970) “group grid” typology to describe the distribution 
of people over four conflicting worldviews.  
The “group” dimension separates people into individualists and communitarians. 
Individualists believe that individuals should stand for themselves and be competitive, 
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while communitarians believe that individuals depend, protect and help one another in 
the form of communal solidarity. The other dimension is the “grid” dimension which 
separates people into hierarchists and egalitarians. Hierachists believe that the 
distribution of “resources, opportunities, respect, and the like” should follow certain 
classification based on traits such as gender, race, kinship, and career; whereas, 
egalitarians value the right of any person or group to participate in any social role they 
select. According to the group grid typology, individuals or groups can be categorized 
into: Hierarchists individualists, hierarchists communitarians, egalitarians individualists, 
and egalitarians communitarians. 
Political orientations (democrats versus republicans), political orientations 
(conservatism versus liberalism), beliefs regarding the magnitude of the governmental 
role in managing the national economy (small role or libertarianism versus wider role), 
and views regarding property rights are all important factors in determining peoples 
appreciation of environmental risk and the need for taking action averting such risks 
(Leiserowtiz 2006, 2005, 2003; O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999, Dietz, Dan, and 
Shwom 2007, Slimak and Dietz 2006). Based on their cultural theory of risk perception, 
Wildavesky and Dake (1990) argued that even though democrats (often liberals) usually 
perceive risk higher than republicans (often conservatives), the differences between the 
two groups stem from different worldviews or cultural biases upheld by the followers of 
the two parties, not from conflict of interests or struggle for offices. The authors further 
asserted that republicans are usually individualists and hierarchists; whereas, democrats 
are usually egalitarians, but not necessary communitarians. Egalitarians tend to perceive 
technological and environmental risks as grave and serious, while hierarchists and 
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individualists tend to perceive technological risks as low and technological benefits as 
high. In the results chapter there I discuss how political orientation impacts ranchers’ and 
farmers’ climate change rick perception end environmental behavior.  
Guagnano, Dietz and Stern (1995) theorized that the influence of values on 
environmental behavior is mediated by general environmental beliefs and worldviews. 
These environmental worldviews are usually represented by convictions regarding the 
relationship between humans and nature. Cotton and Dunlap (1980) identified three 
contradicting general environmental paradigms depicting the relationship between 
humans and their environment. The first paradigm is the “new ecological paradigm” 
(NEP).  As can be seen in table 2-4, the new ecological paradigm implies that earth is a 
finite biophysical environment; hence, it is fragile and vulnerable to human actions and 
growth. In contrast, the dominant western worldviews (DWW) implies that the world is 
vast, unlimited and largely unsusceptible to human actions and growth. The human 
exemptionalism paradigm (HEP) implies that humans are masters of their destiny as their 
ingenuity and accumulated culture emancipate them from the powers of nature and allow 
them to design their destiny regardless of the state of their physical environment (Buttel 
1987). According to the believers in the human exceptionalism paradigm, discussion of 
the impact of human on nature or vice versa is irrelevant because humans have the 
“ultimate resource” within themselves (Simon 1996). 
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Table 2-4: The Three Major Environmental Worldviews. 
 Dominant Western 
Worldview (DWW) 
Human 
Excemptionalism 
Paradigm (HEP) 
New Ecological Paradigm 
(NEP) 
Assumptions 
about Nature of 
Human Beings 
People are 
fundamentally 
different from all other 
creatures on Earth, 
over which they have 
domination 
Humans have cultural 
heritage in addition to 
(and distinct from) their 
genetic inheritance, and 
thus are quite unlike all 
other animal species 
While humans have 
exceptional characteristics 
(culture, technology, etc.), 
they remain one among 
many species that are 
interdependently involved in 
the global ecosystem. 
Assumptions 
about Social 
Causation 
People are masters of 
their destiny; they can 
choose their goals and 
learn to whatever is 
necessary 
Social and cultural 
factors (including 
technology) are the 
major determinants of 
human affairs. 
Human affairs are 
influenced not only by 
social and cultural factors, 
but also by intricate linkage 
of causes, effects, and 
feedbacks from the web of 
nature; thus purposive 
human actions have 
unintended consequences. 
Assumptions 
about the Context 
of Human Society 
The world is vast, and 
thus provides 
unlimited 
opportunities for 
humans 
Social and cultural 
environments are the 
crucial context for 
human affairs, and the 
biophysical 
environment is largely 
irrelevant. 
Humans live in and are 
dependent upon a finite 
biophysical environment 
which imposes potent 
physical and biological 
restraints on human affairs. 
Assumptions 
about Constraints 
on Human Society 
The history of 
humanity is one of 
progress; for every 
problem there is a 
solution, and thus 
progress need never 
cease. 
Culture is cumulative; 
thus technological and 
social progress can 
continue indefinitely, 
making all social 
problems ultimately 
soluble. 
Although the inventiveness 
of humans and the powers 
derived therefrom may seem 
for a while to extend 
carrying capacity limits, 
ecological laws cannot be 
repealed. 
Source: Adapted from Buttel (1987), based on Cotton and Dunlap (1980). 
 
Many studies found that individuals who are more biospherists, altruists, liberal, 
democrats, egalitarians, and (NEP) endorsers are generally more concerned about the 
impacts of climate change and more supportive of climate change policies and actions 
than those who are more conservative, republicans, hierarchists, individualists, and NEP 
opponents (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; Leiserowtiz 2006, 2005, 2003; Slimak and 
Dietz 2006; Dietz, Dan and Shwom 2007).  
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Risk perception itself is an important factor in determining environmental 
behavior, especially within the context of climate change. Many studies showed that 
perceiving the risk of climate changes as temporally close (immediate or within few 
years) and/or spatially close (affecting one’s community, region or country) and/or 
impacting oneself and family result in more willingness to engage in climate change 
aversion individual practices and enhances the willingness to support climate change 
mitigation policies (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; O’Connor et al. 2002; Bord, Fisher 
and O’Connor 1998; Leiserowitz 2006, 2005, 2003, Semenza, Hall et al. 2008).  
Within the same category, Kllestedt, Zahran and Vedlitz (2008) found that 
perceived responsibility toward climate change results in higher climate change risk 
perception and more willingness to support climate change mitigation policies or adopt 
climate change mitigation individual actions. They showed that perceived self-efficacy 
(perceived capability of causing change or imposing impact on the progress of certain 
problem or issue) sometimes results in more support for climate change policies. But, 
some other times it results in more trust in the capacity of technology and scientists to 
mitigate climate change in the future and thus defeats the need for supporting perceived 
costly climate change mitigation policies. 
In my research, I use political orientations, views regarding the role of the 
government, and property rights of Nevada ranchers and farmers as a measure of their 
general beliefs and worldviews. I limited myself to those indicators because those 
worldviews are usually interrelated and related to other beliefs and orientations such as 
“group gird” typology or environmental beliefs as explained above. As can be seen in the 
methodology chapter, I also investigate the impact of climate change specific beliefs on 
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risk perception and environmental behavior. Specifically, I investigate the impacts of 
beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change and beliefs regarding the 
possible causal connections between the contemporary drought in Nevada and climate 
change on ranchers’ and farmers’ attitudes toward climate change and its mitigation 
actions. 
2.2.2 Personal Capacity Motives 
Within the personal capacity category, numerous studies concluded that 
knowledge of climate change causes and impacts influences both risk perception and 
willingness to support and/or adopt climate change mitigation policies and individual 
actions (Jaeger et al. 1993; O’Conner, Bord and Fisher 1999; Bord, O’Connor, and Fisher 
2000; O’Connor et al. 2002). However, different studies reached conflicting findings 
regarding the influence of demographic attributes such as gender, age, income and race 
on supporting climate change mitigation policies (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999; 
O’Connor et al. 2002; Sunblad, Biel and Galing 2007; Kellstedt, Zahran and Vedlitz 
2008; Semenzaet al. 2008). 
Many U.S. citizens have misconceptions about climate change causes and 
impacts. Numerous Americans think that climate change is caused by air pollution, 
deforestation, chlorofluorocarbon emissions (the cause of Ozone Layer degradation), or 
“agitated weather” disturbed by actions such as atomic bombs and space shots. Ample 
numbers of Americans simplify the impacts of climate change to having hotter summers, 
or mix climate change impacts with the Ozone depletion impacts such as skin cancer 
(Bostrom et al. 1994; Seacrest, Kuzelka, and Leonard 2000; Leiserowitz, Smith, and 
Jennifer 2010). 
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Many studies have established that those who have more accurate knowledge 
regarding the causes and impacts of climate change perceive the risk of climate change to 
be higher than those who have confused knowledge on climate change. For example, 
Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007) found that Swedish individuals with better knowledge 
regarding the causes and impacts of climate change perceive both the probability of 
climate change occurrence and the risks of its consequences to be higher than others who 
mention incorrect reasons for climate change or unaware of its impacts. Bord, O’Conner, 
and Fisher (2000) found that Americans who have more accurate knowledge regarding 
climate change tend to perceive the risk of climate change as personally and socially 
more threatening than others. Bord, O’Conner, and Fisher (2000) added that even when 
controlling for risk perception, knowledge continued to be a strong predictor of climate 
change mitigation policy support (Jaeger et al. 1993; O’Conner, Bord and Fisher 1999; 
Bord, O’Connor, and Fisher 2000; O’Connor et al. 2002). As can be seen in the results 
and discussion chapters, I study how beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change influence risk perception and environmental behavior. 
But, research on the impact of demographic attributes on climate change risk 
perception and environmental behaviors reached mixed findings (table 2-5). For example, 
Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007) found that women are more concerned than men 
regarding the impact of climate change. On the other hand, O’Connor et al. (2002) found 
that gender, age, and income are not significantly related to supporting climate change 
mitigation policies, whereas education is. However, O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999) 
found that males, older and more educated persons are more accepting of costly climate 
change policies. Leiserowitz (2006) found that females and non-whites are more willing 
 34
to take actions or support policies in order to mitigate climate change. Whereas, Semenza 
et al. (2008) found that the more educated and younger people are, the more willing to 
engage in pro-environmental behavior addressing climate change they are. They also 
found that gender and ethnicity have no significant impact on pre-environmental behavior 
related to climate change. On the other hand, Dietz, Dan and Shwom (2007) found that 
African Americans and older people tend to be more supportive to costlier climate 
change policies and actions. In this research, I investigate the impact of age and gender 
on ranchers’ and farmers’ attitude toward climate change. 
 
Table 2-5. Examples of Variations Considering the Influence of Demographic Variables 
on Risk Perception and Environmental Behavior. 
Publication Research 
Population 
Significant 
Determinants  
Non-significant 
Determinants  
Independen
t Variable  
Sunblad, Biel and Galing 
(2007) 
621 Swedish  Female(+) Education, 
parenting, age, 
level of 
urbanization 
Risk 
perception 
Leiserowitz 2006 673 Americans Female (+), 
non-white (+) 
Education Risk 
perception 
Semenza et al. (2008) 1202 
respondents in 
Portland OR and 
Houston TX 
Females (+), 
Poorer (+) 
Race, education Risk 
perception 
O’Connor et al. ( 2002) 623 central 
Pennsylvanians 
Younger (+), 
education (+) 
Gender, income Individual 
actions 
Education (+) Gender, age, 
income 
Environmen
tal behavior 
O’Connor, Bord, and 
Fisher (1999) 
723 Americans Female (+), 
education (+) 
Age, Individual 
actions 
723 Americans Education (+) Age, gender Policy 
support 
Leiserowitz (2006) 673 Americans Female (+), 
non-white (+), 
education (+) 
 Policy 
support 
Semenza et al. (2008) 1202 
respondents from 
Portland RO, and 
Houston TX 
Younger (+), 
education (+) 
Gender, race, Individual 
actions 
Dietz, Dan and Shwom 
(2007) 
316 respondents 
in Michigan and 
Virginia 
Older (+), non-
white (+) 
Education, 
gender, income 
Policy 
support 
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I argue that some of the reasons behind the above mentioned inconsistent findings 
stem from the poor framing of the relationships between risk perception, environmental 
behavior and demographic characteristics. In my research, I frame these characteristics 
as indicators or proxies of socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change. I argue that 
these characteristics are not influential by themselves, but by the way they impact 
individuals’ vulnerability to climate change. I argue that the more certain characteristics 
affect individuals’ Se or Ad.C. to climate change, the more they impact individuals’ risk 
perception and environmental behavior decisions. In this research, I investigate the 
impact of some demographic characteristics on attitude toward climate change not as 
independent factors but within the framework of vulnerability. In my research I map 
water stress in Nevada by zip code as indicator of P.V. to climate change imposed 
drought. I also use demographic characteristic such as marital status, education, income, 
source of income, and family size to create indices of ranchers’ and farmers’ Se and 
Ad.C. Additionally, in my statistical analysis I still use gender and age in my analyses’ 
models. 
2.2.3 Contextual Motives 
People’s connections and social networks determine to a great extent their attitude 
toward climate change (interpersonal influences). Cialdini and Trost (1998, p.152) stated 
that, “social norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, 
and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws.” Biel and 
Thogerson (2007) argued that social norms determine the costs and benefits (i.e. 
becoming environmental hero or an environmental geek) of environmental behaviors. 
When a behavior is a part of the social norms of a society, people within that society will 
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cooperate and pool resources to bear the cost. But, when an environmental behavior is not 
a part of the social norms, those who choose to conduct it bear the cost of it alone. 
Jaeger et al. (1993) found that Americans who are members of a social network 
(networking) favoring environmental action or are a part of a community favoring 
environmental action have a better chance in engaging in efforts that mitigate climate 
change. Jones, Botetzaglas, and Malesios (2009); Lubel, Zahran and Vedltiz (2007) 
partially supported this argument by illustrating that Americans living in communities 
with richer social capital and higher civic engagement (higher sense of community and 
reciprocity) have better chances to engage in climate change activism. 
Whitemarsh (2009) studied the impact of the physical conditions on British 
citizens’ environmental behavior in relation to climate change. The study investigated the 
difference between willingness to conduct environmental behavior (intention) and 
actually engaging in environmental behavior (reality) in Hampshire, England. The study 
found that only 41% and 36.4% of the respondents turned the unnecessary lights off or 
purchased energy efficient bulbs respectively.  But, 72.2% and 46.75% of those did that 
to save money. Only, 14.2% of the respondents walked or cycled to work because of 
environmental related concerns, whereas 38.3% did that to improve their health. Only 
6.9% of the respondents used public transportation to protect the environment, but 28% 
used it because of convenience. However, 10.1% of the respondents were engaged in pro-
environmental campaigns because of their environmental concern, while other causes 
such as saving money or protecting personal health were the motives behind minute 
participation in pro-environmental campaigns.  
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When generally speaking of hazards, living in a more hurricane prone or air 
polluted places results in higher perception of risks, and higher support for individual or 
public interventions, research on climate change reached mixed findings regarding the 
impact of P.V. to climate change on risk perception, willingness to engage in fuel 
conservation behavior or support climate change mitigation policy (Elliot et al. 1999; 
Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar 2002; Peacock, Brody and Highfield 200; Brody et al. 2008; 
Zahran el al. 2006).   
Brody et al. (2008) illustrated that those Americans who live closer to the 
coastline and at lower elevations perceive the risk of climate change to be higher than 
those who live away from the coastline or/and at higher elevations, but those who live in 
flood stricken areas (living in a 100 year flood plain) perceive the risk of climate change 
lower than those who live in safer areas. On the other hand, living in areas with an 
increasing number of wildfires, or increasing temperatures does not impact people’s risk 
perception.  
When it comes to climate change mitigation policy support, Zahran et al. (2006) 
found that Americans living in areas experiencing a significant increase in temperature or 
higher natural hazard causality are more supportive to climate change mitigation policies. 
But, people living at the beach (1 mile radius), thus more susceptible to the risk of 
inundation, are less willing to support policies averting the risk of climate change. 
In Britain, Whitmarsh (2008) studied the impact of physical conditions on the 
formulation of the willingness to conduct environmental behavior. She found that among 
the population of Southern England, those who personally suffered from air pollution 
(health problems) or experienced floods in the last 5 years perceive climate change as a 
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personal risk more than others. Also, those who have air pollution health related 
problems believe more in the anthropogenic responsibility for climate change than those 
who experienced floods and the rest of the population. But, both air pollution and flood 
victims are not significantly more willing to take actions that mitigate climate change. 
Trying to understand such mixed results, the researcher interviewed the flood victims in a 
qualitative manner. She found that flood victims perceive climate change and floods as 
two different threats. Flood victims blame the improper infrastructure such as blocked 
ditches and drains, roads, and local development as the reasons behind flooding more 
than the changing weather conditions. Additionally, the flood victims are more 
supportive to immediate adaptation actions that mitigate the impacts of flooding, instead 
of long term climate change mitigation measures.  
As can be seen above, there is only a limited number of studies investigating the 
impact of vulnerability to climate change on risk perception and environmental behavior. 
This limited number dealt with vulnerability as part of the physical contexts focusing 
only on certain physical vulnerabilities and neglecting the interaction between such risks 
and the socioeconomic conditions of exposed individuals that determines their Se and 
Ad.C. Accordingly, my research hopes to fill this gap in the literature through 
investigating the impact of vulnerability as function of the P.V., Se and Ad.C. on risk 
perception and environmental behavior related to climate change. I also investigate if 
believing in climate change as a cause of the impact of concern (In this research the 
impact is water stress and drought in Nevada) affects public attitude toward climate 
change. 
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2.2.4 Habitual Motives 
Duhlstrand and Biel (1997) argued that habits affect human behaviors in a similar 
manner to contextual conditions. They stipulated that environmental behaviors that are 
rooted in individuals’ habits are usually easier to adopt. However, behaviors which 
require habitual changes impose the need for extreme value and belief changes.  
Duhlstrand and Biel (1997) explained that moving from an old habit (freezing routine) to 
a new one passes through different stages. The first stage is questioning the current habit 
in terms of its negative impacts either on oneself, society or environment. The second 
stage is finding an alternative behavior that replaces the old habit’s benefits. The third 
stage is then evaluating the new behavior in terms of its convenience and advantages. The 
final stage is then fixing the new behavior as a new habit. 
Aarts, Verplanken and Knippenberg (1997) found that university students who are 
accustomed to daily car use are less impacted by the provision of information on climate 
change and less willing to use public transportation than those who have weaker habit of 
car use. Whereas, Fujii and Kitamura (2003) established that one month free bus tickets 
resulted in a sustainable increase in the use of public transportation among 23 habitual 
drivers in comparison to a control group of 20 drivers. 
 
2.2.5 Emotional Motives 
In addition to the four categories of motives listed by Stern (2000), recent 
research established a strong impact of the feelings people assign to climate change and 
their risk perception and environmental behavior. Leiserowitz (2003, 2006) found that the 
spontaneous association of climate change with images or words (the affect imagery) 
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highly impacts people’s attitudes toward climate change risk. He found that those who 
spontaneously associate climate change with images or words of devastation, 
catastrophes, and floods perceive climate change risks higher than those who associate it 
with images and words of polar ice melting and heat, higher than those who associate 
climate change to conspiracy, and junk science. In a recent study, Smith and Leiserowitz 
(2010) found that the discrete emotions people associate with climate change have the 
biggest impact on their risk perception and policy preferences. They found that the 
feelings of fear, interest and worry impact peoples climate change risk perception; 
whereas, the feelings of interest, helpfulness, disgust and worry determines peoples 
support for climate change mitigation policies. Feelings alone explain 60% of the 
variance in people risk perception and policy support. 
Studying the impact of habits and emotions on climate change risk perception and 
environmental behavior is out of the scope of my research. However, as can be seen in 
the above section, there are a very limited number of studies that paid attention to these 
categories, and thus there is a clear need for research that covers those areas. 
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES 
 I hypothesize that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms of P.V., Se, 
and Ad.C. increases individuals’ perception of climate change risk. It also enhances 
individuals’ willingness to accept climate change mitigation individual measures and 
public policies. I use Nevada farmers and ranchers as a target group to investigate the 
impact of individual vulnerability on climate change risk perception and environmental 
behavior. I also investigate the impact of the three vulnerability components on risk 
perception and environmental behavior (individual action and public policy support) 
separately. Specifically, I test the following hypotheses:  
1. With respect to climate change, vulnerability increases risk perception  
a. P.V. increases risk perception. 
b. Se increases risk perception. 
c. Ad.C. decreases risk perception 
2. With respect to climate change, vulnerability leads to willingness to adopt 
individual mitigation actions. 
a. P.V. leads to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions. 
b. Se leads to willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions. 
c. Ad.C. decreases willingness to adopt individual mitigation actions. 
3. With respect to climate change, vulnerability leads to supporting mitigation 
policies. 
a. P.V. leads to supporting mitigation policies. 
b. Se leads to supporting mitigation policies. 
c. Ad.C. decreases supporting mitigation policies. 
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3.1 Support from the Climate Change Literature 
Even though few studies have investigated the impact of vulnerability to climate 
change, they provide important insight on the validity of my hypotheses. The work of 
Whitmarsh (2008) Brody et al. (2008) and Zahran, et al. (2006) studied the impact of a 
set of physical vulnerabilities on risk perception and environmental behaviors both in 
Britain and the U.S. The studies reached mixed findings as some physical vulnerabilities 
increase risk perception and the willingness to mitigate climate change, others are neutral 
and others are even decrease risk perception and the willingness to mitigate climate 
change. Such results may stem from the focus on P.V. and neglecting the other two 
components which are Se and Ad.C. Those two other components may enhance the role 
of vulnerability towards playing a bigger role in increasing people’s concerns regarding 
the impacts of climate change and thus their support to climate change policies or actions. 
 
3.2 Support from Literature on Other Environmental Risks 
More support for my hypotheses comes from the research on risk perception and 
environmental behavior, though in contexts different from climate change. As can be 
seen below, many studies have shown a strong impact of actual vulnerability to 
environmental hazards on the risk perception and the willingness to mitigate those 
hazards. For example, Drori and Yuchtman-Yaar (2002) investigated the impact of 
different levels of pollution on the risk perceptions of residents of three different middle-
eastern cities (Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv). The authors illustrated that because of 
different socioeconomic conditions, the cities have different levels of air, water and 
sewage pollutions. Haifa is the most heavily polluted city, Tel-Aviv is in the middle and 
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Jerusalem is the least polluted one. The researchers found that the residents of Jerusalem 
have the lowest risk perception in regard to air pollution, water quality, noise levels, dirt 
and garbage nuisance, and smells and congestion, the residents of Tel-Aviv were second, 
whereas the residents of Haifa have the highest risk perception.  
In a similar study Elliot et al. (1999) found that the actual level of air pollution to 
be a strong determinant of risk perception regarding air pollution among the residents of 
Hamilton Ontario, Canada. In Florida, Peacock, Brody and Highfield (2005) found that 
the people who live in more hurricane prone locations perceive the risk of hurricanes to 
be higher than those who live in safer areas. Brody Peck and Highfield (2005) found that 
the proximity of Texas residents to highly polluted areas determines their perception of 
air pollution risk. 
From the literature on environmental behavior, Blake (2001) established that 
people living in different areas of British Colombia perceive the risks associated with 
their local environments to be higher than other risks. He found that people living in areas 
with more extensive forest and lumber-extracting activities, thus more exposed to 
industrial emissions and natural resources exploitation, to be more concerned about those 
risks than the city center dwellers who are more concerned about auto pollution. 
Additionally, he found that people who live near the extracting industries were more 
supportive to individual political actions such as financial donations for the sake of the 
environment or protesting against industrial pollutions. But, the same people were less 
supportive for governmental intervention that might harm their local economy being 
based on those industries.  
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Moreover, the literature on the impact of race on risk perception adds another line 
of support to my hypotheses. The literature shows that non-whites usually perceive 
environmental risk higher than white males (white male effect) (Flynn, Slovic and Mertz 
1994; Slovic 1999; Finucane et al. 2000; Satterfield, Mertz and Slovic 2004). Such higher 
perception of risk stems partially from the fact that non-whites generally live in areas 
with disproportionate environmental pollution and risk hazards including air pollution, 
hazardous waste risks, and water pollution (Satterfield, Mertz and Slavic 2004; Pulido 
2000; Vaughan 1993; Bulard 1993, Mohai and Bryant, 1992). Because of their 
vulnerability, Mohai and Bryant (1998) found that nonwhite individuals show greater 
environmental concerns regarding local problems such as air pollution, and waste 
management but are less concerned regarding other issues of global scale such as 
deforestation and biodiversity. Consequently, the literature on race and risk perception 
shows some connection between vulnerability (being poorer, less empowered and living 
in riskier areas) and risk perception. 
The literature on the history of the environmental grassroots movements in the 
U.S. qualitatively supports my hypotheses. For example; Dunlap and Mertig (1992) and 
Bullard (1993) described the emergence of local grassroots movements. The grassroots 
movements composed mainly of minorities, against industrial pollution in the 1960 and 
1970s struggling for stricter environmental standards (air and water quality) to protect the 
health of themselves and their children.  In this sense, the grassroots movements were 
direct responses of the increased vulnerability of impoverished minorities suffering 
disproportionate environmental degradation towards a cleaner environment. The fact that 
the grassroots movements were created in the poorest and most impacted parts within the 
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U.S. cities reflect the strong connection between being vulnerable to risks and acting to 
mitigate such risks. This connection may extend to climate change and climate change 
impacts as I hypothesize above. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Within this research project, I am examining the impact of vulnerability to climate 
change on Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perception and support for mitigation 
strategies both at the public policy and the individual levels. Within this chapter, I first 
present my research group and site in relation to climate change impacts. Then I outline 
my research questions and alternative hypotheses followed by an explanation of the 
empirical models I use to test my different hypotheses. Later, I discuss the statistical tests 
I use. Finally, I explain the independent and the dependent variables and measures of this 
research.  
 
4.1 Study Group and Site 
Rural Nevadans, including ranchers and farmers represent a natural target group 
for my research, because they are one of the most vulnerable groups among Nevada 
residents as a result of their intensive reliance on scarce water resources for their 
livelihoods. Also, their intimate relations with natural resources make their climate 
change related risk perceptions and policy views very important. Additionally, Nevada 
ranchers and farmers are important stakeholders in any discussion about water rights and 
resources reallocation expected to take place as a result of both the extended droughts and 
the increasing urbanization (CIER 2008).  
Climate change is already occurring in the Western United States. According to 
the 2009 report of the United States Global Change Research Program (USGCRP) and 
Kim et al. (2002), the average surface temperature in the U.S. West is projected to 
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increase by 2.2oC (4oF) by 2030 and 4.5-6oC (8-11oF) by the end of the century. 
USGCRP (2009) also expected winter precipitation to increase, summer precipitation to 
decrease and snowpack to decrease, negatively impacting the rivers’ runoff in the region. 
According to CIER (2008), by 2100, Nevada is projected to witness a temperature 
rise of 1.7-2.2oC (3-4oF) in the spring and fall seasons, and of 2.8-3.3oC (5-6.4oF) in the 
summer and winter seasons. Additionally, CIER (2008) expected Nevada winter 
precipitation to increase, and summer precipitation to decrease. Some of the most 
important climate change impacts on Nevada will originate in other states. The 
temperature increase in the U.S. West may result in decreasing the snowpack feeding the 
Colorado River system, the main source of water for Southern Nevada (Piechota et al. 
2004; Leung et al. 2004; Miller and Piechota 2008; Karla et al. 2008). Nevada is already 
facing a severe drought dating back to the end of last century (Piechota et al. 2004). The 
Southern Nevada Water Authority  (2007, p. 13) described the average five-year water 
flow of Colorado River over the period 2000-2004 as the “lowest five-year average flow 
since record keeping began in 1906.” Barnettt and Pierce (2008) and Barnettt et al. (2004) 
expected the annual Colorado River flow to decrease by 10-30% over the next 30-50 
years.  
The Colorado River is the major source of water for Lake Mead Reservoir which 
serves two million people in the Las Vegas metropolitan alone in addition to some of 
residents of Southern California, Arizona, and Northern Mexico. The reservoir also 
generates hydropower for 1.3 million people.  Nevada share of the hydropower is 20.7%, 
whereas Arizona consumes 20% and California consumes the remaining 59.3% (USDI 
2010; CIER 2008). The continuous decrease of Lake Mead water level threatens its 
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capacity to meet both water and electricity demands in Nevada and the other 
Southwestern states. 
CIER (2008) showed that climate change may impose serious stresses on the 
major economic sectors including tourism, construction and agriculture. For example, 
CIER expected Nevada to have increasing difficulty sustaining its billions of dollars 
profit from outdoor activities including water sports at Lake Mead; wildlife watching; 
hiking; fishing; and playing golf. It is worth mentioning that Lake Mead alone produces 1 
billion dollars in profit from water sports (CIER 2008). The agricultural sector is 
expected to experience some gains in growing crops because of the increased winter 
precipitation, but to suffer greater losses because of the extended drought. Moreover, 
farmers and ranchers are likely to suffer increased pressure and manipulation to surrender 
their water rights to meet increasing urban and industrial demands.  
Within this research, I study how this vulnerability impacts ranchers’ and farmers’ 
risk perception and environmental behavior decision about climate change. Specifically, I 
study how drought stress varies in Nevada, and then I investigate how such variable 
stresses interact with variable socioeconomic conditions of Nevada ranchers and farmers 
to presumably formulate different risk perceptions and climate change mitigation 
preferences.  
 
4.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Within this research, three sets of hypotheses are tested: 1) Risk perception; 2) 
acceptance of climate change mitigation policies; and 3) willingness to adopt climate 
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change mitigation individual actions. The Research questions and their alternative 
hypotheses are listed below: 
Risk perception with respect to climate change 
1. Does vulnerability increase climate change risk perception? 
H0: ß1= 0 
Ha: ß1>0 
Where: ß1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability 
a. Does P.V. increase risk perception? 
H0: ß11 = 0 
Ha: ß11>0 
Where: ß11is the Coefficient of P.V. 
b. Does Se increase risk perception? 
H0: ß12 = 0 
Ha: ß12 > 0 
Where: ß12 is the Coefficient of Se  
c. Does Ad.C. decrease risk perception? 
H0: ß13 = 0 
Ha: ß13 < 0 
Where: ß13 is the Coefficient of Ad.C. 
 
Individual behavior with respect to climate change 
2. Does vulnerability lead to increased willingness to engage in climate change 
mitigation actions? 
H0: C1= 0 
Ha: C1 >0 
Where: C1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability 
 
a. Does P.V. lead to willingness to engage in mitigation actions 
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H0: C11= 0 
Ha: C11>0 
Where: C11is the Coefficient of P.V. 
 
b. Does Se lead to willingness to engage in mitigation actions? 
H0: C12= 0 
Ha: C12>0 
Where: C12is the Coefficient of Se 
 
c. Does Ad.C. decrease willingness to engage in mitigation actions? 
H0: C13= 0 
Ha: C13<0 
Where: C13is the Coefficient of Ad.C. 
 
Public Policy Support with respect to climate change 
3. Does vulnerability lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies? 
H0: D1= 0 
Ha: D1 >0 
Where: D1 is the Coefficient of vulnerability 
 
a. Does P.V. lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies? 
H0: D11 = 0 
Ha: D11 >0 
Where: D11 is the Coefficient of P.V. 
 
b. Does Se lead to supporting climate change mitigation policies? 
H0: D12 = 0 
Ha: D12 > 0 
Where: D12 is the Coefficient of Se 
 
c. Does Ad.C. decrease supporting climate change mitigation policies? 
H0: D13 = 0 
Ha: D13 < 0 
Where: D13 is the Coefficient of Ad.C. 
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4.3 Empirical Models  
4.3.1 Risk Perception Models 
For Hypothesis 1the model is  
RP = ß0 + ß1 L.V.I. + ß2 A + ß3G + ß4 Po.O.+ ß5 CC.B.+ ß6 D.B. 
 
Where, RP is climate change risk perception that reflects the respondents’ 
appreciation for the seriousness of climate change impacts on the respondents 
themselves, their families, their communities, the U.S., modern countries, least wealthy 
countries, future generations, and the world plants and animals (question 35, Appendix 
1);  ß0 is the intercept; LVI denotes vulnerability measured as a Livelihood Vulnerability 
Index which is a composite index of P.V., Se and Ad.C. (Hahn, Riederer and Foster 
2009). A is for age, and G is for gender. Po.O. means political orientations (conservative 
or not); and CC.B. denotes beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change. 
D.B. denotes beliefs regarding the connection between climate change and the 
contemporary drought in Nevada. 
 
For Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c, the model is 
RP = ß0 + ß11 P.V. + ß12 Se + ß13 Ad.C. + ß2 A + ß3G + ß4 Po.O.+ ß5 CC.B.+ ß6 D.B. 
 
Where, P.V. is for physical vulnerability measured through determining the Water 
Resource Vulnerability index (WRV) by zip code; Se is Sensitivity to climate change 
measured through determining the respondents reliance on the climate change sensitive 
ranching and farming for livelihood; Ad.C. is adaptive capacity measured by estimating 
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the social status index (income, education and marital status) of the respondents. A, G, 
Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. denote the same meaning as in the previous model. 
4.3.2 Individual Behavior Models 
For Hypothesis 2, the model is  
Logit (IB) = C0 + C1 L.V.I. + C2 A + C3 G + C4 Po.O.+ C5 C.H.B+ C6 D.B. 
 
Where, IB denotes willingness to adopt climate change mitigation individual 
behaviors ranging from doing nothing to using public transportation more (see Appendix 
1, question 38) ; C0 is the intercept; L.V.I., A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as 
under in the Risk Perception subsection. 
 
For Hypotheses 2a.2b, and 2c, the model is  
Logit (IB) = C0 + C11 P.V. + C12 Se +C13 Ad.C.+ C2 A + C3 G + C4 Po.O.+ C5 CC.B.+ C6 
D.B. 
Where, A is for age, G for gender, P.O. for political orientation, CC.B. for beliefs 
regarding climate change causes and D.B. is for beliefs regarding the possible causal 
relationship between drought and climate change in Nevada. 
4.3.3 Mitigation Policy Models 
For Hypothesis 3, the model is  
Logit (SPP) = D0 + D1 L.V.I. + D2 A + D3 G + D4 Po.O.+ D5 CC.B.+ D6 D.B. 
 
Where, SPP is the willingness to support climate change mitigation public 
policies ranging from doing nothing to imposing taxes on citizens (see Appendix 1, 
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question 39); D0 is the intercept L.V.I., A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as in 
the subsections above. 
 
For Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c, the model is  
Logit (SPP) = D0 + D11 P.V. + D12 Se + D13 Ad.C. + D2 A + D3 G + D4 Po.O.+ D5 
C.H.B+ D6 D.B. 
Where, SPP, D0, A, G, Po.O., CC.B., and D.B. are the same as in the model for 
Hypothesis 3. 
 
4.4 Statistical Analyses Methods 
I analyzed the research data using a two-step strategy. Firstly, I conducted three 
sets of bivariate correlation tests.  The first set is for the risk perceptions by risk targets 
among themselves and variables that include age, gender, political orientations, beliefs 
about climate change causes, beliefs about possible connections between Nevada drought 
and climate change, in addition to vulnerability, P.V., Se and Ad.C. to climate change.  
The second set of correlation tests is for the willingness to engage in a set of 
climate change mitigation individual actions among themselves and the same set of 
variables mentioned in the case of risk perception. The third set of correlation tests is for 
the willingness to support a list of climate change mitigation policies among themselves 
and the same list of variables tested for in the previous two sets of tests.  
Secondly, I conducted three sets of regressions analyses as will be detailed in the 
following sections. Correlation tests do not establish relationships between independent 
and dependent variables, yet they show linear associations between variables in one to 
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one basis. Correlations tests help discover possible multicollinearity between the 
independent variables and thus help avoid the use of highly correlated variables in 
regression models (Moore, McCabe and Craig 2009).  
4.4.1 Risk Perception Hypotheses Testing. 
The hypotheses regarding climate change risk perception were tested using 
multiple regression analysis. Multiple regression analysis investigates the impact of 
multiple explanatory variables on a single independent response variable (Moore, 
McCabe and Craig 2009). Multiple regression analysis  uses the method of ordinary least 
square (O.L.S) to draw the best fit regression line through minimizing the sum of all the 
squared deviations of the distances of all the points to the line (Moore, McCabe and Craig 
2009). Multiple regression analysis helps estimate the regression parameters that 
determine the change in the response variable with the change of each explanatory 
variable. It also helps investigate the significance of the causal relationships (hypotheses 
testing) between the explanatory variables and the response variable. One last important 
benefit of using multiple regression analysis is estimating the amount of the response 
variable predicted by the different explanatory variables in the regression model of 
concern (Moore, McCabe and Craig 2009). 
There are seven assumptions underlying the use of Classical linear Regression 
model (CLR) adopted by the multiple regression statistical test. These assumptions are 
essential to any meaningful use of this model in investigating any scientific issue. 
Violating such assumption may result in serious impacts on the results and thus the value 
of these results (Kennedy 2009). These assumptions are: 
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1- The first assumption is that the regression model is linear in parameters (Bs), 
but not necessarily in variables. That is for any model, the relationship 
between the dependent variable (Y) and the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables (Xs) is of linear nature; whereas, the relationship with the 
explanatory variables themselves may or may not be linear as in the case of 
(Log X) or X2 (Gujarati, and Porter 2009);  
2- The second assumption is that the expected value for disturbances, or 
residuals or errors is zero and so the mean of the distribution of such 
residuals is drawn to zero for any given value of Xi;  
3- The third assumption is that X values are fixed. However in many social 
sciences data on both the explanatory variables and the independent variable 
are collected randomly and so they are stochastic variables (Gujarati and 
Porter 2009). When the X variables are stochastic the assumption necessary 
for the CLR (or more accurately the New-Classical Linear Regression model) 
to apply is that the X variable and the error term are independent from each 
other;  
4- The fourth assumption is that the variance of Y(ui) is constant regardless of 
the value of X (Homoscedasticity);  
5- The fifth assumption is that the error values are not auto-correlated with one 
another;  
6- The sixth assumption is that the number of observations is greater than the 
number of parameters to be estimated and explanatory variables to be 
investigated;  and 
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7- The last assumption is that X variable has more than one value because the 
same value of X cannot establish any evidence against or with the linear 
relationship between Xs and Y.  
 
4.4.2 Individual Behavior and Mitigation Policy Hypotheses Testing 
For every individual behavior or public policy choice, I ran logistic regressions 
utilizing the models listed above. In the case of individual behaviors and public policies, 
the dependent variables are dichotomous as the answer for every choice is either yes or 
no.  Even though, a binary variable can be presented quantitatively in a binary form with 
the numbers zero and one, it cannot be analyzed using multiple regression tests (Pampel 
2000; Peng and Harry 2002).  
Using OLS regression for analyzing a dichotomous dependent variable suffers 
from two different types of problems, conceptual and statistical. The conceptual problems 
stem from the fact that while linear regression can be extended toward positive and 
negative infinity, the value of the independent variable is a probability limited between 0 
and 1. Accordingly, using ordinary least square regression will result in one coefficient 
for every independent variable that is assumed to be the same regardless of the value of X 
(the independent variable), where in reality with dichotomous variables the impact of the 
changes of X in the middle region is much bigger than those changes that take place near 
the 0 and 1 limits (Pampel 2000). 
Moreover, linear regression assumes additivity, as the linear regression assumes 
that the impact of an independent variable stays the same regardless of changes in the 
other independent variables. With dichotomous dependent variables, the effect of 
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independent variables is sensitive to changes in other independent variables especially 
close to the 0 and 1 limits of probability. The ceiling 1 and the floor 0 make the influence 
of the independent variables inherently non-additive and interactive (Pampel 2000). 
Statistically, the fact that dichotomous indicators or phenomena are limited to two 
possible answers (yes and no, or 1 and 0) violates two important assumptions inherent to 
the ordinary least square model which are normality of error distribution and 
homoscedasticity. Because there are only two possible values for the dependent variable, 
the error terms are skewed toward the zero and 1 values and thus not normally distributed 
around the predicted independent variables. In dichotomous variables analysis, the error 
terms tend to be minimal around the middle area of probability, but greater close to the 
floor or the ceiling which means that the error terms are correlated to the independent 
variables (heteroscedasticity). The violation of those two assumptions results in biased 
estimation of the confidence intervals which invalidate the test of significance. In 
conclusion, using ordinary least square is not suitable for hypothesis testing for binary 
phenomena (Pampel 2000).  
To avoid the biases resulting from using the multiple regression analysis, I used 
the logistic regression (logit) analyses to test the hypotheses related to the research 
questions regarding the determinants of willingness to engage in climate change 
mitigation actions and support of climate change mitigation policies. The logistic 
transformation of probability linearizes the inherently non-linear relationship between the 
probability and the independent variables through stretching the probabilities of Y (the 
dependent variable) at extreme values relative to the values near the midpoint. 
Accordingly, the same change of X results in similar effect on the logit regardless of the 
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distance from the ceiling or floor probabilities. The logit regression result in unbiased 
estimates of the coefficients, test of significance and explanatory power (Pampel 2000; 
Peng and Harry 2002).   
Pampel (2000) illustrated that the logistic regression linearizes the inherently 
nonlinear relationship between the dependent variable and independent variables in the 
case of dichotomous dependent variables in two steps. First, it transforms probabilities 
into odds which allow for having continuous values ranging from zero to infinity. 
Second, it transforms the odds into logits by taking the natural logarithm of the odds 
which allow for having negative values ranging from (–) infinity to zero. If the 
probability function is  
Pi = e E0+E1X1                                                                                                                                                        (4.1) 
Then the odd function is  
Oi = Pi /(1-Pi) = e E0+E1X1/ 1- e E0+E1X1                                                               (4.2) 
           The logit function is then  
   Ln Oi = logit = Ln [Pi / (1-Pi)] = E0 + E1 X1                                                                           (4.3) 
 
For every coefficient, the logistic regression programs in SPSS and SAS provide 
the regular (p) value or significance interval, and the Wald coefficient which equal the 
square of the ratio of the coefficient divided by its standard deviation and have a chi-
square distribution. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) can be used specially for 
those coefficients with significant (p) to test the strength of significance. To reject the 
null hypothesis (coefficient is zero), BIC which is (z2 – Ln) or (Wald –Ln n) should 
exceed zero. If BIC equal zero, then the null hypothesis is not rejected. If BIC ranges 
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from 0-2, then there is a week support for significance. If BIC ranges from 2-6, the 
support is positive for significance, but if BIC 6-10, then the support is strong. If BIC is 
more than 10, then the support is very strong (Pampel 2000; Peng and Harry 2002). 
Logistic regression offers a pseudo-variance analogous to the analysis of variance 
characterizing the ordinary least square model. The pseudo variance in the logit 
regression plays the same role of the R2 in the case of the ordinary least square regression 
as it indicates the explanatory power of the logit model to the dependent variable. The 
SPSS output offers two measures of the pseudo-variance: the Cox and Snell measure and 
the adjusted Nagelkerke measure (Pampel 2000; Peng and Harry 2002).  
In the literature on environmental behavior, the logistic regression table was 
provided including coefficients, exponentiated coefficients (Exp. B), Wald values, and 
intervals if significance. The exponentiated coefficient (Exp. B) helps identify the 
direction of the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variables of concern. If Exp (B) is more than 1, then the impact is positive. If the Exp (B) 
is less than one then the impact is negative.  
 
4.5 Data Collection 
In this research, I used secondary and primary data to calculate the different 
indices necessary for examining my hypotheses. I collected secondary data to assess 
water resources vulnerability around Nevada. I also collected primary data for assessing 
both the Se and Ad.C. of individual Nevada ranchers and farmers, in addition to ranchers’ 
and farmers’ risk perception and environmental behavior related preferences. 
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4.5.1 Primary Data 
As part of the NV NSF Climate Project, I and my colleagues working for the 
Policy, Decision Making and Outreach Component PDOC surveyed Nevada farming and 
ranching community in two phases: The first phase was in December 2009 and the 
second phase in August 2010. Through the survey, we collected data on Nevada 
ranchers’ and farmers’ socioeconomic characteristics, climate change related views, 
beliefs, risk perceptions and willingness to adopt or support climate change mitigation 
actions and policies (see Appendix 1).  
In the two phases, we sent surveys to 1872 farmers and ranchers, representing the 
majority of Nevada ranching and farming community (USDA 2010). The list was 
collected from a partner university program. We sent mail-out, mail-back survey packets 
to all famers on the list. In the first phase, each packet included an 8 page survey, a cover 
letter personally signed by Dr. William James Smith Jr. (my supervisor and the head of 
the PDOC), a holiday card and a prepaid return envelope (Schutt 2006). In the second 
wave, the packets included only personally signed cover letters, the surveys, and the 
prepaid return envelops. In total, 479 surveys from ranchers and farmers from all over 
Nevada (Figure 4-1) were filled and sent back to make a response rate of 25.6%. 
However, it is worth mentioning that not all surveys were completely filled as can be 
seen later in the results chapter. As can be seen in the Figure 4-1 the biggest 
concentration of Nevada ranchers and farmers are in the northern part of the state, mostly 
in Elko and Churchill counties while the smallest concentration is in Southern Nevada. 
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        Figure 4-1. Respondents’ distribution in Nevada. 
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4.5.2 Secondary Data 
I also collected secondary data on Nevada water resources availability, water use 
and population distribution. Two GIS based databases were necessary: Water availability 
and use; and population.  For water availability and use, I utilized the latest version of 
Water-Global Assessment and Prognosis (WaterGAP 3.1) developed by the Center for 
Environmental Systems Research, Kassel University, Germany in cooperation with the 
National Institute of Public Health and the Environment (Perveen 2008). The population 
database (LandScan 2008) was collected from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
Tennessee. I signed a license agreement with both the Center for Environmental Systems 
Research and Prognosis, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory so I could use the two 
datasets for the purposes of this research.  
This WaterGAP 3.1 dataset lists the mean surface water availability and use 
monthly values and annual sums during the period 1971-2000. The dataset is available in 
gridded vector format with a spatial resolution of 5’ x5’ or about 9 km x 9 km (Figure 
4.2). The dataset does not cover the groundwater availability in Nevada, but surface water 
is the major water supply for agricultural use in Nevada as 63% and 82% of the water 
demand for irrigation and livestock respectively is met using surface water (Nevada 
Division of Water Planning 1999). According to Doll, Kaspar and Lehner (2003) and 
Perveen and James (2009) Water GAP databases use the best data available coupled with 
two models that include the two major components of water vulnerability: A global 
hydrology model; and a global water use model. The hydrology model estimates surface 
runoff, groundwater recharge and rivers’ discharge, while the water use model computes 
water use for households industry, irrigation, and livestock sectors.  
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       Figure 4-2. Gridded natural surface water availability in Nevada. 
        Source: WaterGAP 3.1. 
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Water resources can be studied and evaluated using at least two different 
categories of data structures: Political boundaries based structures; and watershed based 
structures. The scale of analysis relies on its objectives, For example, water resource 
managers at the municipality level will be interested in studying water resources 
availability and uses within the boundaries of their municipality, whereas scientists may 
be interested in studying certain water resource management issues at the national or 
regional scales. Water resource experts are increasingly agreeing that best analyses of 
water resources are those performed at the watershed-level, because the watershed is the 
venue where all hydrologic processes such as water generation, transportation, 
precipitation, recharge, and evaporation take place and shape the water availability of that 
watershed regardless of any political consideration. However, because people are sub-
grouped into different political entities, socioeconomic data are always available in 
accordance within political borders, which does not necessarily correlate with the natural 
ones (Alcamo et al. 2003a; Perveen and James 2009; Doll and Hauschild 2002). 
Gridded models were created as a solution for the disparity between the politically 
based data structures and the watershed ones. Gridded models data structured politically 
(socioeconomic) can be integrated, compared with, or merged with data that are 
structured by river basin or watershed (Doll and Hauschild 2002; Perveen and James 
2009).  According to Alcamo et al. (2003b), the need for scale flexible water resource 
modeling techniques, able to answering question regarding both water availability and 
use worldwide resulted in the creation of WaterGAP models. So far three different 
generations have been produced WaterGAP 1, 2 and 3. The WaterGAP models group is 
one of many other global water analysis models; groups, but it is unique in the fact that it 
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provides modeling capacities for both water supply and demand (Alcamo et al. 2003b).  
The WaterGAP models also offer the opportunity to compare current and future 
freshwater availability and use in different parts of the world at different scales.  
Perveen and James (2009) investigated the impact of scale on the variance and 
standard deviation of variables. They found that the variability (difference in statistical 
means between cells) of un-scaled variables such as population and water supply 
increases with increasing the scale (the grid size). Whereas, the variability of scaled 
variables, such as water availability per capita, and population density, decreases with 
increasing the scale. 
The LandScan 2008 database is available in raster format with spatial resolution 
of 30"x30" or about 1 km x 1km (Figure 4-3). The LandScan utilizes the best available 
census data and four primary population indicators including land cover, roads, slopes 
and night time lights to map population distribution at finer scales than block-level 
census data (Perveen 2008; Oak Ridge National Laboratory 2011). 
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   Figure 4-3. Population distribution in Nevada in raster format. 
    Source: LandScan 2008. 
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As can be seen from the discussion on data collection above, I collected 
secondary data with two different spatial resolutions, 9 km x 9 km (Water GAP 3.1) 1 km 
x 1km (LandScan 2008). I also collected data on the respondent ranchers’ and farmers’ 
addresses in zip codes. Because of the inconsistency of the three datasets I collected in 
terms of spatial resolution, I used the ARCGIS 9.3 procedures (mostly spatial join 
functions) to aggregate the three databases to the zip code scale. 
 
4.6 Measures: Dependent Variables 
I used three survey questions to measure the dependent variables of my research: 
1) Risk perception; 2) willingness to engage in climate change mitigation individual 
actions; and 3) willingness to support climate change mitigation policies. The questions 
took the numbers 35, 38, and 39 respectively. The wording of the three questions is 
shown below. 
 
Risk Perception  
35. Please use the scale below to indicate how much you think climate change will 
negatively impact the following.  
A) _____You personally 
B) _____Your family 
C) _____Your surrounding ranching/farming community 
D) _____People in the United States 
E) _____People in other modern industrialized countries 
F) _____People in least-wealthy countries 
G) _____Future generations of people 
H) _____Plant and animal species 
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Individual Behavior  
38. What of the following are you willing and able to do about climate change to reduce 
its impacts? Please check as many as you would adopt. 
□ Increase the amount of insulation in your home to decrease your energy 
consumption. 
□ Install low-energy light bulbs in your house. 
□ Plant more trees near your home. 
□ Use public transportation more than you do now.  
□ Use more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
□ Nothing 
Others________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Public Policies 
39. At the national level, which of the following policies and initiatives would you 
support to help reduce climate change? Check as many as you would support. 
□ Develop renewable energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal.  
□ Educate the public, including through schools, on human causes of climate 
change. 
□ Impose taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for 
climate change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into 
increased prices of some goods. 
□ Impose taxes on fossil fuels (gasoline) for climate change mitigation, 
understanding that this might translate into higher gasoline prices. 
□ Impose taxes on citizens for climate change mitigation. 
□ Pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles. 
□ Pressuring the U.S. government to ratify international protocols which 
commit the U.S. to fast reduction of carbon emissions. 
□ Use market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial 
emissions. 
□ Nothing 
Others________________________________________________________ 
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4.7 Measures: Independent Variables 
4.7.1 Vulnerability Indices 
Within this research, I calculated indices for climate change P.V., Se, and Ad.C. 
of Nevada ranchers and farmers, and then I aggregated those indices in one vulnerability 
index.  In the following subsections, I provide a detailed description of the calculation I 
conducted. 
Physical vulnerability (P.V.): I used water resource vulnerability as an indicator 
of the P.V. to climate change of Nevada ranchers and farmers. I used ARCGIS 9.1 
software to map and calculate both the Falkenmark Index (population/ natural surface 
water availability) and Criticality Ratio (water use/ natural surface water availability 
water availability) by zip code (Falkenmark and Widstrand 1992; Kulshreshtha 1999; 
Perveen and James 2009). As discussed above, I used both the WaterGAP.3.1 database 
for data on natural water availability and water use, and the LandScan 2008 population 
datasets. I normalized the two indices using the following equation. 
Indexsd =Sd-Smin/Smax-Smin                                                                        (4.4)       
                                                                                  
Then, I used both the normalized Falkenmark index and Criticality Ratio to 
estimate the Water Vulnerability Index (WRV) which is used as the P.V. index in this 
research. The WRV was calculated using the following equation. It ranges from 0-1 (See 
Figure 5.4 in the results section).  
WRV= (normalized Falkenmark Index+ normalized Criticality Ratio)/2    (4.5) 
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Sensitivity index (Se):  I used the External Income Diversity Index as a proxy for 
ranchers’ and farmers’ Se to climate change. For every rancher and farmer, I calculated 
the proportion of her/his income originating from agricultural activities to the total 
household income (Hahn, Riederer and Foster 2009). Then I normalized the index using 
equation (4.4).  
Adaptive capacity (Ad.C.): For Ad.C. I calculated two indices: The Social Status 
Index and the Poverty Index. I calculated the Social Status Index based on Halingshed 
(1975). It ranges from 26 to 66. This index is derived from 4 factors which are occupation 
(career), education, income and marital status (Hollingshed 1975; Cirino et al. 2002). For 
single, divorced and widowed ranchers and farmers, I used only their education to 
calculate their education scores, but for married ones I averaged the scores of both the 
rancher and farmer and her/his spouse. The scores of education are listed in table 4-1. For 
career or occupation scores I used the total income of each rancher and farmers to assign 
her/him a score as in the following table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71
Table 4-1. Education and Occupation Scores for Calculating the Social Status Index. 
Education Scores 
Educational Degree Score 
Middle School 6 
High School 12 
Some college or 2-year college degree 15 
4-year college degree 18 
Graduate and professional 21 
Occupation Scores 
Income Score 
$0-25,000 20 
$25,000—50,000 25 
$50,000-100,000 32.5 
$100,000-300,000 40 
>300,000 45 
Source: Created from Hollingshed (1975). 
 
The Poverty Index was calculated by deducting the poverty line from the 
household income for every rancher and farmer surveyed (income – poverty line) as 
developed by Foster, Greer and Thorbeckei (1984). The Poverty line is derived from the 
U.S. department of Health and Human Services (HHS 2009) based on the household size 
(Table 4-2). Then I normalized both indices using equation (4.4). Finally, I averaged the 
two indices by summing the two normalized indices and dividing them by two to 
formulate the Ad.C. index. 
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Table 4-2. The 2010 Poverty Guidelines for the 48 Continuous States and the District of 
Columbia.  
Family Size Poverty Line 
1 $10,830 
2 $14,570 
3 $18,310 
4 $22,050 
5 $25,790 
6 $29,530 
7 $33,270 
8 $37,010 
Source: Adopted from HHS (2009). 
 
Vulnerability:  As a composite vulnerability index I used the approach of Hahn, 
Riederer and Foster (2009) in calculating the Livelihood vulnerability Index ranges from 
-1 (least vulnerable) to 1 (most vulnerable). I used the following equation improved from 
Hahn, Riederer and Foster (2009): 
Vulnerability= L.V.I = (P.V.-Ad.C.+Se)/3.                                                          (4.6)                         
 
4.7.2 Models Parameters  
As can be seen above the regression models include variables proven significant 
or often investigated as determinants of risk perception and environmental behavior. 
These variables were measured through survey questions as following: 
? Age: The ranchers and farmers were asked to state their age in question 1 
? Gender: Question two asked the ranchers and farmers to check their gender. 
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? Ideological affiliation: As can be seen in Appendix 1, question 21, ranchers 
and farmers were asked to indicate their political orientation on range from 
1 (very liberal) to 5 (very conservative). For the regression models we 
modified the scale to 1 (conservative) and 0 (non-conservatives) (O’Connor, 
Bord and Fisher, 1999; Leiserowtiz, 2006, 2005, 2003; Dietz, Dan and 
Shown 2007). 
? Beliefs regarding the causes of climate change: Those beliefs were 
measured through asking the participants to rank their agreement on the 
statement “I believe that human activity has been playing a significant role 
in recent climate change” using a scale that ranges from 1 (Strongly 
disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). This question was listed as branch (D), in 
question 30 of the survey (Appendix 1).  
? Beliefs regarding the connection between the temporary drought in Nevada 
and climate change. In question 40, of the survey (Appendix 1), ranchers 
and farmers were asked to check what they perceived as causes of the 
contemporary drought in Nevada. I used only the branch on climate change 
as a cause. My variable ranged from (1) if checked to (0) if not checked. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RESULTS 
 
5.1 Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ General Characteristics 
 
The survey data indicates that only 26.3% of Nevada ranchers and farmers are 
females (N=476). Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ average age is 61.8± 13.3 years old 
(Median 62, N =472); whereas, the minimum age is 21 and the maximum is 95 years old. 
The vast majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N = 473) are married (83.7%), while 
7.8% of them are widowed, 4.4% are divorced and 4.1% are single. The average size of 
Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ households is 2.6 ± 1.4 members (N=449). The smallest 
household’s size is 1 and the largest is 9.  
Ranchers and farmers are a well-educated group; only 18.1% (N=474) of them 
hold high school education or less (Figure 5-1). About 32.7% of Nevada ranchers and 
farmers hold some or two years college education, 32.9% of them hold 4-year college 
degrees, and the rest (16.3%) hold graduate and professional degrees.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Figure 5-1. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ education level. 
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The majority of Nevada Agricultural community perform both ranching and 
farming (Figure 5-2). The biggest proportion of our participants (38.7%, N =457)  
practice both ranching and farming, 28.4% practice ranching, 26.5% practice farming, 
and 6.3% practice other agricultural activities such as beekeeping, aquaculture and 
organic educational agriculture.  
 
 
Figure 5-2. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ agricultural activities. 
 
Most of Nevada ranchers and farmers (64.0%, N=425) rely on other sources of 
income in addition to their agricultural activities. While, about 62.1% of the participant 
ranchers and farmers (N= 425) make less than $25,000 a year from agricultural activities, 
only 15.2% of them make less than $25,000 as a net household income (Figure 5-3). 
Most of Nevada ranchers and farmers make less than $150,000 a year; as much as 94.4% 
and 85.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers make less than $150,000 a year as 
agricultural income and a net household income respectively. Only 2.3% of the surveyed 
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ranchers and farmers make more than $500,000 as a net household income, while 0.9% 
make more than $500,000 from agriculture only. 
 
   Figure 5-3. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ agricultural and net household incomes.  
 
5.2 Worldviews and Political Orientations  
Nevada ranchers and farmers are a highly politicized and conservative group. 
About 97.8% of the participants are registered to vote (N=461). About 73.3% of Nevada 
ranchers and farmers (N=434) are Republicans, 13.8% are democrats, 11.3% are either 
independents or supporting other parties (Tea Party and the Green Party) Only, a very 
small minority of them (1.6%) are not interested in politics. This political affiliation is a 
translation of a ubiquitous conservative orientations as the vast majority (76.4%) of 
Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=454) consider themselves conservatives or very 
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conservative (Figure 5-4). Only 7.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers consider 
themselves liberal or very liberal and 16.1% consider themselves middle of the road.  
 
 
Figure 5-4. The political orientations of Nevada ranchers and farmers. 
 
The more conservative stance of most Nevada ranchers and farmers expresses 
itself in their opinions and worldviews. The vastest majority of Nevada ranchers and 
farmers are libertarians as they do not support a big governmental role in the economy. 
About 69.0% of them (N=462) believe that the government should have a minimal role in 
the economy, 27.3% believe the government should have a moderate role, and only 3.7% 
of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that the government should have large role in the 
economy. Moreover, 74.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=461) agree or strongly 
agree with the statement that “property rights guarantee the right to do whatever you want 
on your own land”, compared to 6.3% who are neutral, and 19.1% who disagree or 
strongly disagree with this statement. 
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5.3 Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ Vulnerability to Climate Change 
Mapping water stress in Nevada using data on surface water availability and use 
in Nevada over the period 1971 to 2000, and 2008 population by zip code reveals that the 
most water stressed areas are those in Washoe, Carson City and Clark counties. Washoe, 
Carson City and Clark counties include the largest urban centers in Nevada which are 
Reno, Carson City and Las Vegas metropolitan areas respectively (Figure 5-5). The range 
of Water Vulnerability Index spans from 0.0 at zip codes 89883, Elko County, to 0.56 in 
zip code 89134, Clark County. The Ad.C. index ranges from 0.01 for a married person, 
with middle school education (same for the spouse) and annual income of less than 
$25,000, to 0.96 for another married person with a 4-year college education (same for the 
spouse) and a household income that is more than one million U.S. dollars. Se index 
ranges from 0.00 for a participant whose agricultural income is only about 3 % of her/his 
household income, to 1 for a participant who relies entirely on farming for his household 
income.  
The composite index of vulnerability ranges from -0.29 to 0 0.46.  the -0.29 
vulnerability value is assigned for a participant who lives in a relatively water rich area, 
holds a 4-year college degree, married to a 4-year college graduate spouse, and earns a 
household income that exceeds the million dollars limit, with only 9% of this income 
originates from ranching/farming. Whereas, the vulnerability index value of 0.46 is 
assigned to a participant who is married, lives in a water stressed area,  holds a high 
school degree (the spouse has some college education), and earns a household income of 
less than $25,000 originates entirely from agriculture. 
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   Figure 5-5. Water resource vulnerability in Nevada. 
 
5.4 Views, Beliefs and Opinions on Climate Change 
The vast majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (94.2%, N=479) are aware of 
climate change, mostly through TV (60.3%), radio (29.0%), and the internet (21.9%). 
However, as can be seen in figure 5-6, only 61.3% of them believe that we are in a period 
of climate change (N=468), 93.0% believe that climate change happens naturally over 
time (N=470), and as few as 28.9% (N=465) believe that human activity is a significant 
cause of climate change. A very slim minority (6.0%, N=465) believe that human activity 
is the only cause of climate change.  
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Figure 5-6. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ beliefs regarding climate change and its causes. 
 
The denial of climate change and its anthropogenic causes extends to include the 
ranchers’ and farmers’ views regarding the scientific agreement on climate change. 
Around 30.0% (N= 473) of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that scientists disagree 
among themselves regarding the reality of climate change (Figure 5-7). About 12.7% of 
the ranchers and farmers believe that scientists agree that climate change is happening, 
26.2% believe that the scientists agree that climate change is happening, but mostly 
natural, and 16.9% believe that the scientists agree that climate change is happening but 
mostly anthropogenic. On the other hand, 3.6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe 
that the scientists agree that climate change is not happening, and 10.6% of Nevada 
ranchers and farmers do not know enough about the scientist’s position regarding climate 
change. 
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Figure 5-7. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ views regarding the scientists’ agreement on climate 
change and its causes. 
 
The biggest percentage of Nevada ranchers and farmers (36.9%, N=442) are not 
sure regarding the time at which climate change will start harming their communities 
(Figure 5-8).  About 31.9% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that climate change is 
affecting their communities now or will start impacting such communities within the next 
10 years. On the other hand, 23.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that their 
communities will never be impacted by climate change, or will be impacted only in the 
coming 50-100 years (3.8%), or 25 years (3.8%). 
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 Figure 5-8. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ expectations regarding the immanency of climate change 
impacts. 
 
Nevada ranchers and farmers show optimistic bias in their climate change risk 
judgments as they tend to rate climate change risk on themselves (Self) and family (Fa) 
lower than other risk targets such as their ranching and farming communities (Ag), least 
wealthy nations (L.W.N.), future generations (Gn.) and ecosystems (Eco.). As can be 
seen in Table 5-1, only 12.4% (N=443) and 14.3% (N=440) of Nevada ranchers and 
farmers rate the expected impact of climate change on themselves or their families 
respectively to be a great deal, but 28.8% (N=438) rate climate change impacts on the 
least wealthy countries to be a great deal, compared to 28.0% (N=436), and 24.4% 
(N=439) for future generations and plants and animals respectively. Almost 59.1% and 
54.8% of Nevada ranchers and farmers believe that climate change will not impact or 
impact themselves and their families only a little respectively. These percentages go 
down to 44.3%, 42.2%, and 46.5% when using least wealthy countries, future generations 
and plants and animals as risk targets. When using the U.S. and the industrialized 
countries (W.N.) as risk targets, 20.6% (N=438), and 17.8% (N=437) of Nevada ranchers 
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and farmers rate climate change risk as a great deal respectively, compared to 44.6% and 
46% who rate climate change risk as nonexistent or only a little. 
 
Table 5-1. Nevada Ranchers’ and Farmers’ Climate Change Risk Perceptions.  
Risk 
Perception 
Self 
 
Fa 
 
Ag U.S. 
 
W.N. L.W.C Gn. Eco. 
Not at All 30.9% 27.5% 23.5% 20.8% 21.3% 25.3% 23.2% 23.7% 
Only a 
Little 
28.2% 26.6% 23.3% 23.7% 24.7% 18.9% 19.0% 22.8% 
A 
Moderate 
Amount 
24.8% 27.3% 25.5% 27.4% 25.2% 17.1% 17.9% 19.8% 
A Great 
Deal 
12.4% 14.3% 24.2% 20.6% 17.8% 28.8% 28.0% 24.4% 
Don’t 
Know 
3.6% 4.3% 3.6% 7.5% 11.0% 9.8% 11.9% 9.3% 
N 438 436 437 432 432 432 431 434 
 
 
Regarding the drought which is affecting Nevada since the last few years of the 20st 
century, Nevada ranchers and farmers tend not to connect it to climate change (Figure 5-
9). Only, 26% of Nevada ranchers and farmers (N=479) think of climate change as a 
possible cause of the current drought but 9% blame the production of greenhouse gases as 
a separate cause of the drought.  Whereas, 80% think that the current drought is the part 
of a natural climate cycle that impact Nevada. About 6% of Nevada ranchers and farmers 
blame pollution for the current drought, but 65% of the respondents blame the cities and 
the over consumption of water. 
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    Figure 5-9. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary      
drought in Nevada. 
 
The optimistic bias of Nevada ranchers and farmers regarding the severity and 
imminences of climate change impacts on themselves, families and communities 
presumably resulted in a relaxed attitude regarding the personal importance of climate 
change to them (5-10). Only 8% of Nevada ranchers and farmers think that climate 
change is extremely important to them, 16.6% consider climate change to be very 
important to them, but 75.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers consider climate change as 
unimportant or somewhat important. 
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Figure 5-10. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ appreciating of climate change importance to them 
personally. 
 
The willingness of Nevada ranchers and farmers to adopt one or more climate 
change mitigation individual actions of a list offered to them in the survey varies 
depending on the perceived cost or difficulty of each of the choices (See Figure 5-11). 
About 59.1% of the respondents (N=479) indicate that they are willing to increase the 
amount of installations in their homes to decrease their energy consumptions and 60.1% 
(N=479) stated that they are willing to install low-energy light bulbs in their houses. 
Actually, some of the ranchers and farmers indicate that they have already increased the 
amount of insulation and installed low-energy light bulbs in their houses. Many 
participants (16) stated in their written comments that they are willing to apply one or 
both of those acts (or already did) because it “makes sense” or saves money” regardless 
of the connection to climate change.  
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A smaller majority of Nevada ranchers and farmers (53.0%, N=479) are willing to 
plant trees, or use more fuel-efficient vehicles (51.4%, N=479). The willingness to 
decrease energy consumption (or mitigate climate change) plummets to 9.2% (N=479) 
when speaking about increasing the use of public transportation. This option is perceived 
as inconvenient or even impossible as reported by some participants who stated that they 
live tens of miles away from any built environment.  However, Nevada farmers and 
ranchers are not big supporters of doing nothing as only 13.4% of them indicated that 
they are willing to do nothing for climate change mitigation. 
 
 
 
Fig 5-11. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to adopt climate change mitigation actions. 
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When it comes to public policies, Nevada ranchers and farmers are not big 
supporters of governmental interventions. Only 3.6% (N=479) of the respondents think 
that climate change should be considered a top or high priority to the U.S. government, 
and 12.7% think that climate change should be a high governmental priority (Figure 5-
12). On the other hand, 28.8% think that climate change should not be a priority at all to 
the U.S. government and the majority 54.9 % think climate change should be considered 
a low or medium priority.  
 
 
Figure  5-12. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ appreciation of climate change as a national 
priority. 
 
When asking about specific climate change mitigation policies, a solid majority 
(69.1%, N=473) of the respondents support developing renewable energy resources, but 
not any of the other policy options (Figure 5-13). Only 41.2% of the respondents support 
pressuring the car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, less respondents 
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(33.2%) support educating the public about climate change and its human causes through 
schools, and much less respondents (16.7%) support pressuring the government to ratify 
international climate change protocols. The least popular of all is taxation policies.  
While 28.5% of Nevada ranchers and farmers support using market incentives and 
pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial emissions of CO2, only 15.0% support 
imposing taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for climate 
change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into increased prices of some 
goods. Even less popular is imposing taxes on fossil fuels (9.7%), and citizens (2.3%) for 
climate change mitigation. However, only 16.9% of the respondents support doing 
nothing as a governmental policy facing climate change. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13. Nevada ranchers’ and farmers’ Support of different climate change public policies. 
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5.5 The Determinants of Risk Perception 
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms 
of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases individuals’ perception of climate change risk. They also 
predicted that both P.V. and Se to climate change as separated factors increase risk 
perception, while Ad.C. decreases risk perception. 
To test these hypotheses a set of bivariate correlations and multiple regression 
analyses were performed. The correlation analyses included testing the relationships 
between the respondents’ risk appreciation on different risk targets and the composite 
vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index. Additionally, the analyses 
included possible correlations between risk appreciation by risk target and other 
parameters including age, gender, political orientation (conservative or not), beliefs 
regarding climate change (believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change), and 
beliefs concerning the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (believing in 
climate change as a possible cause or not). 
Two sets of ordinary least square multiple regression analyses were conducted. 
One set that includes risk perception by risk target as dependent variables and a model 
that contains the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political orientation, beliefs 
regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in 
Nevada. The other set includes risk perceptions by risk target and a model that contains 
indices of the separated components of vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender, 
political orientation, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs concerning the causes 
of the contemporary drought in Nevada. 
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The correlation analyses reveal that neither composite vulnerability index nor its 
components correlate with any of the ranchers’ and farmers’ risk perception on the set of 
risk targets examined except for climate change risk on the least wealthy countries, where 
living in more water stressed areas (P.V.) correlates positively with ranchers’ and 
farmers’ risk perception (Table 5-2). Age also seems not to correlate with risk perception 
on any risk target; however, gender and political orientation correlate consistently will 
risk perception on all targets. Women and non-conservatives rank the risk of climate 
change higher than men and conservatives on all risk targets. Believing in the 
anthropogenic causes of climate change correlates strongly with risk perception on all 
risk targets with Pearson Correlation Coefficients ranging from 0.465 to 0.556. Believing 
that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada also 
correlates strongly with risk perception on all risk targets with Pearson Correlation 
Coefficients ranging from 0.436 to 0.443. 
Table 5-2. Correlation Matrix of Risk Perception by Risk Target (R.T.) and 
Determinants. 
R.T Self Fa Ag U.S. W.N. L.W.N. Gn. Eco 
L.V.I (.000) 
N=376 
(.012) 
N=374 
(.006) 
N=376 
(-.037) 
N=370 
(.010) 
N=371 
(-.088) 
N=373 
(-.048) 
N=372 
(.058) 
N=372 
P.V. (.051) 
N=426 
(.008) 
N=424 
(.093) 
N=426 
(.036) 
N=420 
(.071) 
N=420 
(.112)* 
N=423 
(.086) 
N=421 
(.095) 
N=422 
Ad.C. (.042) 
N=391 
(.023) 
N=388 
(.030) 
N=391 
(.064) 
N=385 
(.033) 
N=386 
(.079) 
N=387 
(.049) 
N=386 
(.030) 
N=387 
Se (.017) 
N=400 
(.024) 
N=397 
(.003) 
N=400 
(-.027) 
N=394 
(.030) 
N=395 
(-.081) 
N=395 
(-.049) 
N=394 
(-.064) 
N=396 
A (-.064) 
(N=437) 
(-.041) 
N=434 
(-.015) 
N=437 
(-.039) 
N=431 
(.006) 
N=431 
(-.014) 
N=433 
(-.062) 
N=431 
(-.034) 
N=433 
G (-.209)** 
N=440 
(-.226)** 
N=437 
(-.247)** 
N=440 
(-.225)** 
N=434 
(-.214)** 
N=434 
(-.239)** 
N=436 
(-.182)** 
N=434 
(-.206)** 
N=436 
P.O. (-.275)** 
N=425 
(-.308)** 
N=422 
(-.331)** 
N=425 
(-.331)** 
N=419 
(-.282)** 
N=419 
(-.362)** 
N=420 
(-.306)** 
N=418 
(-.337)** 
N=421 
C.H.
B 
(.531)** 
N= 434 
(.548)** 
N=434 
(.531)** 
N=434 
(.515)** 
N=428 
(.465)** 
N=428 
(.556)** 
N=428 
(.533)** 
N=427 
(.548)** 
N=430 
D.B. (.474)** 
N=443 
(.469)** 
N=440 
(.459)** 
N=443 
(.409)** 
N=437 
(.318)** 
N=437 
(.404)** 
N=438 
(.399)** 
N=436 
(.404)** 
N=439 
 Pearson Correlation in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level. 
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The regression analyses of risk perception by risk target and a model that include 
vulnerability to climate change , as composite index of P.V., Se, and Ad.C.,  shows that 
vulnerability to climate change is not a determinant of risk perception on any risk target 
(Table 5-3). Age and gender are not insignificant determinants of risk perception. Except 
for themselves and families, conservatives continued to perceive climate change risk 
lower than others according to this model. Ranchers and farmers who believe that climate 
change is anthropogenic and a possible cause of Nevada drought perceive climate change 
risk higher than others on all risk targets. 
 
Table 5-3. O.L.S Regression Results Explaining Risk Perceptions by Risk Target Using a 
Model That Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index. 
Risk 
Target 
Self 
 
Fa 
 
Ag 
 
U.S. 
 
W.N. 
 
L.W.N. Gn 
 
Eco 
 
Intercept 1.865 
(.330)** 
1.829 
(.335)** 
2.129 
(.365)** 
1.946 
(.388)** 
1.630 
(.419)** 
2.080 
(.415)** 
1.722 
(.443)** 
1.931 
(.400)** 
L.V.I. .187 
(0.288) 
.358 
(.292) 
.258 
(.318) 
-.063 
(.338) 
.357 
(.366) 
-.524 
(.362) 
-.193 
(.387) 
-.163 
(.349) 
A -.007 
(.003)* 
-.004 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.004) 
.003 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
-.006 
(.005) 
-.003 
(.004) 
G -.137 
(.108) 
-.190 
(.109) 
-.221 
(.119) 
-.226 
(.128) 
-.235 
(.138) 
-.368 
(.136)** 
-.056 
(.144) 
-.208 
(.131) 
P.O. -.093 
(.119) 
-.164 
(.120) 
-.337 
(.131)* 
-.297 
(.140)* 
-.332 
(.151)* 
-.460 
(.149)** 
-.345 
(.159)* 
-.341 
(.144)* 
CC.B. .299 
(.041)** 
.322 
(.042)** 
.323 
(046)** 
.354 
(.049)** 
.344 
(.052)** 
.383 
(.052)** 
.428 
(.055)** 
.399 
(050)** 
D.B. .691 
(.114)** 
.674 
(.116)** 
.617 
(.127)** 
.445 
(.135)** 
.298 
(.146)* 
.554 
(.144) 
.523 
(.153)** 
.497 
(.139)** 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.381 .407 .383 .340 .275 0.397 .347 .378 
N 363 360 363 352 358 359 359 359 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
The multiple regression analyses of risk perception by risk targets and the model 
that include the separated components of vulnerability reveal a little bit more complicated 
picture on the role of vulnerability components on climate change risk perception (Table 
5-4). The model is a robust model explaining 0.28 to .427 of the variance in risk 
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perception depending on the risk target examined. The regression analyses establish that 
P.V. makes people perceive the risk of climate change on themselves, their families, and 
the U.S. lower than those who are less physically vulnerable. Regarding the other risk 
targets such as the wealthy countries, least wealthy countries, future generations and 
plants and animals, physical vulnerability stops being a significant determinant of risk 
perception. In other words, those farmers/ranchers who live in a more water stressed 
areas, thus more vulnerable to possible climate change imposed drought, perceive the risk 
of climate change to be less serious on themselves, their families and the U.S. than those 
who live in less vulnerable areas.  
 Adaptive Capacity does not impact risk perception on any risk target. However, 
Se to climate change positively impacts risk perception on oneself, families and wealthy 
countries. In other words, ranchers and farmers who depend more on agriculture for their 
living perceive the risk of climate change on themselves, families and wealthy countries 
higher than those who have higher share of their income originating from other sources. 
When it comes to other risk targets, the more sensitive ranchers and farmers perceive risk 
the same as the less sensitive ones. 
 Age and gender do not seem to be significant determinants of risk perception on 
any risk target except for less wealthy countries where women perceive the impact of 
climate change to be greater on them than men. Except for oneself and families, the 
conservative ranchers and farmers rank climate change risk lower than the liberals or 
middle of the road ones. Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change and 
believing that climate change may be a cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada 
increase climate change risk appreciation on all risk targets. 
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Table 5-4. O.L.S Regression Results Explaining Risk Perceptions Using a Model That 
Includes the Three Components of Vulnerability Separated. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
In summary, vulnerability to climate change as a function of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. 
is not a determinant of risk perception. However, the components of vulnerability act 
differently. P.V. results in less risk perception on oneself and family; whereas, Se results 
in higher risk perception on oneself and family and less wealthy countries. However, both 
P.V. and Se are not significant determinants of the risk perception on other risk targets.  
Ad.C. does not result in any change of risk perception on any risk target. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk 
Target 
Self Fa 
 
Ag 
 
U.S. 
 
W.N. 
 
L.W.N. 
 
Gn. 
 
Eco 
 
Intercept 1.626 
(.362)** 
1.635 
(.366)** 
1.922 
(.405)** 
1.684 
(.427)** 
1.288 
(.436)** 
1.798 
(.460)** 
1.583 
(.493)** 
1.932 
(.445)** 
P.V. -1.078 
(.435)* 
-1.331 
(.439)** 
-.581 
(.487) 
-1.087 
(.512)* 
-.543 
(.557) 
-.447 
(.553) 
-.301 
(.592) 
-.519 
(.535) 
Ad.C. .554 
(.293) 
-.462 
(.295) 
.419 
(.328) 
0.644 
(.354) 
.617 
(.375) 
.710 
(.373) 
.338 
(.399) 
.101 
(.361) 
Se .334 
(.138)* 
.394 
(.139)** 
.278 
(.115) 
.268 
(.163) 
.405 
(.177)* 
.052 
(.176) 
-.062 
(.327) 
.005 
(.170) 
A -.006 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.003) 
-.001 
(.004) 
.001 
(.004) 
.005 
(.004) 
.002 
(.004) 
-.006 
(.005) 
-.003 
(0.004) 
G -.158 
(.107) 
-.207 
(.108) 
-.247 
(.120) 
-.245 
(.127) 
-.268 
(.138) 
-.383 
(.136)** 
-.060 
(.678) 
-.200 
(.132) 
P.O. -.142 
(.119) 
-.228 
(.120) 
-.354 
(.134)** 
-.350 
(.141)** 
-.351 
(.153)** 
-.482 
(.152)** 
-.364 
(.162)** 
-.375 
(.147)** 
C.H.B 0.301 
(.041)** 
0.325 
(.041)** 
.325 
(.046)** 
.357 
(.048)** 
.347 
(.052)** 
.385 
(.052)** 
.429 
(.055)** 
.400 
(050)** 
D.B. 0.715 
(.113)** 
.702 
(.114)** 
.624 
(.127)** 
.477 
(.134)** 
.315 
(.145)* 
.557 
(.144)** 
.539 
(.154)** 
.513 
(.139) 
Adjusted 
R2 
0.396 .427 .382 .353 .281 0.400 .347 .378 
N 364 361 364 358 359 360 360 360 
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5.6 The Determinants of Willingness to Act to Mitigate Climate Change 
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change as a 
function of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in 
individual actions aiming at mitigating climate change. They also predicted that both P.V. 
and Se to climate change as separate factors increase the willingness to mitigate climate 
change, while Ad.C. decreases such willingness. 
I performed a set of bivariate correlations and logistic regression analyses to test 
the above mentioned hypotheses. The correlation analyses included testing the 
relationships between the willingness to conduct a set of collimate change mitigation 
actions and the composite vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index. 
The set of actions includes doing nothing, increasing the amount of insulation at home 
(In), installing low-energy light bulbs (E.L), planting more trees (Tr.), increasing use of 
public transportation (Trans.), and using more fuel efficient vehicles (E.Ve.). 
Additionally, I tested for possible correlations between willingness to engage in climate 
change mitigation individual actions and other parameters including age, gender, political 
orientation (conservative or not), beliefs regarding climate change (believing in the 
anthropogenic causes of climate change), and beliefs regarding the causes of the 
contemporary drought in Nevada (believing in climate change as a possible cause or not). 
Two sets of Logistic regression analyses were performed. One set that includes 
willingness to act individually for mitigating climate change as a dependent variable and 
a model that encloses the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political 
orientations, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the 
contemporary drought in Nevada as the independent variables. The second set of logistic 
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regression analyses includes willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change as 
a dependent variable and a model that encloses indices of the separated components of 
vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender, political orientation, beliefs regarding 
climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada. 
The correlation analyses reveal that there is no significant correlation between the 
composite vulnerability Index and the willingness to engage in any of the individual 
actions investigated (Table 5-5). P.V. positively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ 
intention to install light bulbs, but does not correlate with their willingness to do any 
other activity. Se, on the other hand, negatively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ 
willingness to plant trees and use fuel efficient vehicles, but does not correlate with their 
willingness to do any other activity. Ad.C. does not correlate with the willingness to 
engage any climate change individual action. Age negatively correlates with the 
willingness to plant trees and use public transportation.  
Being a woman positively correlates with the willingness to increase the amount 
of insulation at home or usage of more fuel efficient vehicles, and negatively correlates 
with the willingness to do nothing to mitigate climate change. Being conservative 
negatively correlates with the willingness to do all of the mitigation options listed, and 
positively correlates with the willingness to do nothing. Believing that climate change is 
anthropogenic and believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary 
drought in Nevada correlate positively with the willingness to engage in all climate 
change mitigation individual actions listed, and negatively correlates with the willingness 
to do nothing to mitigate climate change. 
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Table 5-5. Correlation Matrix of Willingness to Act Individually Mitigating Climate 
Change and Determinants. 
Pearson Correlation in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to engage in climate change 
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the composite 
index of vulnerability, shows that vulnerability does not influence ranchers’ and farmers’ 
willingness to do any of the individual actions aiming at mitigating climate change(Table 
5-6).  Age does not impact the willingness to do any individual action, except for planting 
trees and using public transportation; older ranchers and farmers are less willing to plant 
trees or use public transportation.  
The analyses show that both gender and political orientation do not influence 
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in climate change mitigation actions. 
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and farmers 
more willing to engage in energy conservation actions. Believing that climate change is a 
Action In 
 
E.L. 
 
Tr. 
 
Trans. 
 
E.Ve. 
 
Doing 
Nothing 
 
L.V.I. (-.050) 
N= 399 
(-.057) 
N=399 
(-.068) 
N=399 
(-.082) 
N=399 
(-.089) 
N=399 
(-.041) 
N=399 
P.V. 
       
(.047) 
.N=458 
(.108)* 
N=458 
(.033) 
N=458 
(.005) 
N=458 
(.086) 
N=458 
(-.075) 
N=458 
Ad.C. 
        
(.026) 
N=417 
(.025) 
N=417 
(.003) 
N=417 
(.058) 
N=417 
(.035) 
N=417 
(.001) 
N=417 
Se 
        
(-.072) 
N=425 
(-.078) 
N=425 
(-.108)* 
N=425 
(-.079) 
.425 
(-.102)* 
N=425 
(-.017) 
N=425 
A 
        
(-.059) 
N=472 
(-.078) 
N=472 
(-.193)** 
N=472 
(-.120)** 
N=472 
(.011) 
N=472 
(.044) 
N=472 
G 
        
(-.138)** 
N=476 
(-.087) 
N=476 
(-.056) 
N=476 
(.005) 
N=476 
(-.127)** 
N=476 
(.092)* 
N=476 
P.O. 
        
(-.178)** 
N=454 
(-.219)** 
N=454 
(-.143)** 
N=454 
(-.115)* 
N=454 
(-.253)** 
N=454 
(.206)** 
N=454 
CC.B.      (.347)** 
N=465 
(.474)** 
N=465 
(.339)** 
N=465 
(.215)** 
N=465 
(.427)** 
N=465 
(-.338)** 
N=465 
D.B. 
        
(.275)** 
N=479 
(.341)** 
N=479 
(.163)** 
N=479 
(.133)** 
N=479 
(.253)** 
N=479 
(-.193)** 
N=479 
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possible cause of the contemporary drought makes ranchers and farmers more willing to 
increase the amount of insulations and energy-efficient light bulbs, but does not influence  
Their willingness to increase their use of public transportation, use more fuel efficient 
vehicles, or plant more trees. 
 
Table 5-6. Logit Regression Results Explaining Willingness to engage in Mitigation 
Actions Using a Model that Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index.  
 The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
Action In 
 
E.L. 
 
Tr. 
 
Trans. 
 
E.Ve. 
 
L.V.I. 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.749 
.106 
(.745) 
.784 
 
.813 
.281 
(.596) 
.650 
 
.729 
1.174 
(.279) 
.454 
 
1.263 
2.733 
(.098) 
.113 
 
.773 
1.982 
(.159) 
.337 
A 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.009 
1.583 
.208 
.989 
 
.010 
3.668 
(.055) 
.982 
 
.009 
12.628 
(.000)** 
.969 
 
.014 
4.206 
(.040)* 
.971 
 
.009 
.013 
(.909) 
.999 
G 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.289 
2.833 
(.092) 
.615 
 
.316 
1.375 
(.241) 
.690 
 
.269 
.260 
(.610) 
.872 
 
.430 
.231 
(.631) 
1.229 
 
.288 
1.430 
(.232) 
.708 
P.O 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.325 
.070 
(.791) 
.917 
 
.369 
.069 
(.792) 
.907 
 
.302 
.115 
(.734) 
.903 
 
.444 
-.019 
(.889) 
.940 
 
.324 
2.834 
(.092) 
.580 
CC.B. 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.110 
19.522 
(.000)** 
1.623 
 
.128 
41.881 
(.000)** 
2.286 
 
.107 
24.045 
(000)** 
1.686 
 
.176 
6.160 
(.013)* 
1.548 
 
.112 
35.799 
(.000)** 
1.960 
D.B.        
Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.329 
8.001 
(.005)** 
2.537 
 
.393 
10.959 
(.001)** 
3.673 
 
.295 
.037 
(.847) 
.945 
 
.429 
1.434 
(.231) 
(1.672) 
 
.314 
1.059 
(.303) 
1.381 
Constant 0.667 .282 1.199 -2.184 -.366 
Negalkerke  R2 0.227 .377 .192 .137 .298 
N 382 382 382 382 382 
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The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to engage in climate change 
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the separate 
components of vulnerability, shows that none of the vulnerability components influence 
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to do any of the individual actions aiming at 
mitigating climate change (Table 5-7).  Age does not impact the willingness to do any 
individual action, except for planting trees and using public transportation; older ranchers 
and farmers are less willing to plant trees or use public transportation. Both gender and 
political orientation do not influence ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in 
climate change mitigation actions.  
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and 
farmers more willing to engage in all energy conservation actions and planting trees. 
Believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought makes 
ranchers and farmers more willing to increase the amount of insulations and install 
energy-efficient light bulbs, but does not influence their willingness to increase their use 
of public transportation or fuel efficient vehicles, or plant trees. 
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Table 5-7. Logit Regression Results Explaining Willingness to engage in Mitigation 
Actions Using a Model that Includes the Separated Components of Vulnerability. 
 The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Action In 
(N=383) 
E.L. 
(N=383) 
Tr. 
(N=383) 
Trans. 
(N=383) 
E.Ve. 
(N=383) 
P.V. 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
1.238 
.053 
(.817) 
.751 
 
1.409 
.168 
(.682) 
1.781 
 
1.179 
.001 
(.970) 
1.1045 
 
2.079 
1.527 
(.217) 
.077 
 
1.293 
.020 
(.888) 
1.200 
Ad.C. 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.753 
.019 
(.890) 
1.110 
 
.818 
.006 
(.937) 
.937 
 
.743 
1.207 
(.272) 
.442 
 
1.226 
.001 
(.980) 
.970 
 
.768 
.017 
(.895) 
(.904 
Se 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.359 
.018 
(.893) 
.953 
 
.388 
.417 
(.519) 
.778 
 
.353 
3.344 
(067) 
.525 
 
.616 
1.516 
(.218) 
.468 
 
.366 
2.165 
(.141) 
.583 
A 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.009 
1.570 
.210 
.989 
 
.010 
3.731 
.053 
.981 
 
.009 
13.852 
(.000)** 
.968 
 
.015 
4.135 
(.042)* 
.970 
 
.009 
.042 
(.837) 
.998 
G 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.291 
2.699 
.100 
.620 
 
.321 
1.373 
(.241) 
.687 
 
.273 
.096 
(.757) 
.919 
 
.433 
.267 
(.605) 
1.250 
 
.292 
1.256. 
(.262) 
.721 
P.O. 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.329 
.101 
.750 
.901 
 
.372 
.041 
(.839) 
.927 
 
.308 
.101 
(.751) 
.907 
 
.450 
-.071 
(.789) 
.887 
 
.328 
2.661 
(.103) 
.586 
C.H.B 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.110 
19.530 
.000** 
1.624 
 
.128 
41.962 
(.000)** 
2.292 
 
.107 
24.281 
(000)** 
1.694 
 
.177 
6.437 
(.011)* 
1.567 
 
.113 
35.944 
(.000)** 
1.965 
D.B 
       Std. Error 
        Wald 
       Significance 
       Exp. (B) 
 
.330 
8.203 
.004** 
2.577 
 
1.029 
10.779 
(.001)** 
3.640 
 
.296 
.063 
(.801) 
.928 
 
.430 
1.538 
(.215) 
(1.705) 
 
.315 
.998 
(.318) 
1.369 
Constant 0.664 .282 1.722 -1.658 -.167 
Negalkerke  R2 0.229 .380 .200 .143 .301 
N 383 382 383 383 383 
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Choosing not to do anything to mitigate climate change individually is mostly 
determined by beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change and to a 
lesser extent regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (Table 5-8). 
Believing that human activity imposes significant impact on climate change and 
believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada, 
make people less willing to do nothing, at the individual level to mitigate climate change. 
Neither vulnerability to climate change nor its components impose any significant impact 
on ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to do nothing. The other determinants also fail to 
significantly impact such choices including being conservative. Being conservative seems 
to be a significant determinant only at 10% confidence level. 
In summary, vulnerability to climate change and its three components do not 
predict ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change. 
Age, gender and political orientation are at best week determinants of the willingness to 
engage in climate change mitigation individual activities. The most prominent and 
consistent factor is belief in the anthropogenic causes of climate change, which makes 
people more willing to act. Connecting the contemporary drought in Nevada to climate 
change plays a less important role in determining peoples’ intention to do something 
about climate change at the individual level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 101
Table 5-8. Logit Regression Results Explaining the Willingness to Do Nothing to 
Mitigate Climate Change Using Two Models: One Includes the Composite Vulnerability 
Index and Another Includes Its Separate Components. 
Paramete
r 
Coefficients Logistic Regression Results 
for Model 1 
( The Composite 
Vulnerability Index) 
Logistic Regression Results 
for  
Model 2  
( The Separate Components) 
LVI Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
1.108 
2.019 
(.155) 
.207 
 
P.V. Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
    Exp. (B) 
 2.120 
.004 
.950 
1.141 
Se Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
    Exp. (B) 
 .577 
3.144 
(.076) 
.359 
Ad.C. Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
 1.251 
.403 
(.525) 
.452 
A Std. Error 
 Wald 
  Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
.014 
1.803 
(.179) 
1.020 
.015 
1.889 
.169 
1.020 
G Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
.0459 
.404 
(.525) 
.747 
.464 
.353 
(.552) 
.759 
P.O. Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
1.084 
3.168 
(.075) 
6.885 
1.099 
3.312 
(.069) 
7.396 
CC.B. Std. Error 
Wald 
 Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
.305 
25.845 
(.000)** 
.309 
25.866 
(.000)** 
(.208) 
D.B. Std. Error 
 Wald   
Significance 
Exp. (B) 
1.058 
3.724 
(.054) 
.130 
1.067 
3.989 
(.049)* 
.119 
 Constant -1.317 .792 
 Negalkerke  
R2 
.384 .390 
 N 383 383 
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
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5.6 The Determinants of Support for Climate Change Mitigation Policies 
My hypotheses predicted that increased vulnerability to climate change in terms 
of P.V., Se, and Ad.C. increases ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support climate 
change mitigation policies at the national level. They also predicted that both P.V. and Se 
to climate change as separated factors enhance support of climate change mitigation 
policies at the national level, while Ad.C. decreases such support. 
To test these hypotheses a set of bivariate correlations and regression analyses 
were performed. The correlation analyses included testing the relationships between the 
willingness to support climate change mitigation policies at the national level and the 
composite vulnerability index, P.V. index, Se index, and Ad.C. index. The set of policies 
includes doing nothing, developing renewable energy resources (R.En.), educating the 
public on the human causes of climate change (Ed), imposing taxes on industries and 
corporates that produce greenhouse gases (T.Ind.), imposing taxes on fossil fuels (T.Fu.), 
imposing taxes on citizens to mitigate climate change (T.Ci.), pressuring car companies 
to produce more fuel efficient vehicles (Fu.E.), pressuring the U.S. government to ratify 
international protocols (Pr.), and using market incentives to reduce industrial greenhouse 
gases emissions (Mar.). Additionally, I tested for possible correlations between 
willingness to support climate change mitigation policies at the national level and other 
parameters including age, gender, political orientation (conservative or not), beliefs 
regarding climate change (believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change), and 
beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary drought in Nevada (Believing in climate 
change as a possible cause or not). 
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Two sets of logistic regression analyses were conducted. One set that includes the 
support of climate change mitigation policies at the national level as dependent variable 
and a model that included the composite vulnerability index, age, gender, political 
orientations, beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the 
contemporary drought in Nevada as the independent variables. The second set of logistic 
regression analyses include the support of climate change mitigation policies at the 
national level as dependent variable and a model that includes indices of the separated 
components of vulnerability (P.V., Se and Ad.C.), age, gender, political orientation, 
beliefs regarding climate change and beliefs regarding the causes of the contemporary 
drought in Nevada. 
The correlation analyses reveal that there is no significant correlation between the 
composite vulnerability index and support of any of the public policies investigated 
except for taxing gasoline (Table 5-9). Vulnerability negatively correlates with taxing 
gasoline. P.V. positively correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support all 
the public policy options investigated except for taxing citizens. However, Se negatively 
correlates with ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support taxing corporates, taxing 
fuel and ratifying international protocols, but does not correlate with their willingness to 
support any of the other policies. Ad.C. does not correlate with the willingness to support 
any of the climate change mitigation policies.  
The correlation analyses also show that age negatively correlates with the 
willingness to support taxing citizens, positively correlates with the willingness to 
support pressuring the care companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and does 
not correlate with any of the other options. They also show that being a woman positively 
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correlates with supporting almost all the policy options except taxing fuel and taxing 
citizens. Being a conservative negatively correlates with the willingness to support all the 
mitigation climate change policies investigated. Believing that climate change is 
anthropogenic correlates positively with the willingness to support all the investigated 
climate change mitigation policies. Additionally, believing in climate change as a 
possible cause of the contemporary drought in Nevada also positively correlates with 
supporting all the mitigation policies proposed in the survey. 
 
Table 5-9. Correlation Matrix of Supporting Climate Change Mitigation Policies and 
Determinants. 
Pearson Correlation in parentheses. 
P denotes Policy . 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The logistic regression analyses, of the willingness to support climate change  
mitigation actions as dependent variables and the model that includes the composite 
index of vulnerability, show that vulnerability does not influence ranchers’ and farmers’ 
Policy R.En. Ed. T.Ind. T.Fu. T.Ci. Fu.E. Pr. Mar. 
L.V.I. (-.054) 
N=399 
(.-094) 
N=399 
(-.097) 
N=399 
(-.152)** 
N=399 
(-.82) 
N=399 
(.025) 
N=399 
(-.067) 
N=399 
(-.063) 
N=399 
P.V. 
 
(.154)** 
N=458 
(.137)** 
N=458 
(.220)** 
N=458 
(.176)** 
N=458 
(.035) 
N=458 
(.144)** 
N=458 
(.092)* 
N=458 
(.117)* 
N=458 
Ad.C. 
 
(.004) 
N=417 
(.064) 
N=417 
(.015) 
N=417 
(.069) 
N=417 
(.046) 
N=417 
(-.036) 
N=417 
(-.015) 
N=417 
(.034) 
N=417 
Se 
 
(-.088) 
N=425 
(-.124) 
N=425 
(-.157)** 
N=425 
(-.192)** 
N=425 
(-.056) 
N=425 
(.002) 
N=425 
(-.128)** 
N=425 
(-.084) 
N=425 
A 
 
(-.035) 
N=472 
(-.029) 
N=472 
(.032) 
N=472 
(-.013) 
N=472 
(-.094)* 
N=472 
(.111)** 
N=472 
(.087) 
N=472 
(-.028) 
N=472 
G 
 
(-.148)** 
N=476 
(-.153)** 
N=476 
(-.166)** 
N=476 
(-.079) 
N=476 
(-.026) 
N=476 
(-.212)** 
N=476 
(-.132)** 
N=476 
(-.218)** 
N=476 
P.O. 
 
(-.218)** 
N=454 
(-.292)** 
N=454 
(-.436)** 
N=454 
(-.432)** 
N=454 
(-.167)** 
N=454 
(-.326)** 
N=454 
(-.387)** 
N=454 
(-.351)** 
N=454 
CC.B. (.412)** 
N=465 
(.587)** 
N=465 
(.548)** 
N=465 
(.484)** 
N=465 
(.203)** 
N=465 
(.499)** 
N=465 
(.525)** 
N=465 
(.464)** 
N=465 
D.B. 
 
(.303)** 
N=479 
(.452)** 
N=479 
(.485)** 
N=479 
(.401)** 
N=479 
(.177)** 
N=479 
(.316)** 
N=479 
(.463)** 
N=479 
(.311)** 
N=479 
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willingness to support most of the policy options listed in the survey except for taxing 
gasoline, and taxing corporates (Table 5-10). Those who are more vulnerable to climate 
change are less supportive of taxing gasoline and corporates to mitigate climate change.  
Older people are less supportive of taxing citizens than younger ones, but more 
supportive of pressuring the companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and 
pressuring the government to ratify international protocols. Women are significantly 
more supportive than men for pressuring the car companies to produce more fuel-
efficient vehicles and using market incentives to decrease the industrial greenhouse gases 
emissions, but are the same as men regarding the other policy options investigated. Being 
conservatives is a significant determinant of the ranchers and farmers support for most 
policies except educating the public, developing renewable energy resources, and taxing 
citizens, as conservatives are less supportive of all the other mitigation policies.  
However, the analyses reveal that that believing in the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change makes ranchers and farmers more willing to support all mitigation policy 
options. Believing that climate change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought 
increases ranchers’ and farmers’ support for most of the proposed policies except for 
taxing citizens, pressuring car companies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles, and 
using market incentives to decrease the industrial greenhouse gases emissions where this 
belief stops being a significant determinant 
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Table 5-10. Logit Regression Explaining Support of Climate Change Mitigation Policies 
Using a Model that Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index. 
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
The logistic regression analyses of the willingness to support climate change 
mitigation policies as dependent variables and the model that includes the separated 
components of vulnerability show that neither P.V. nor Ad.C. is a significant factor in the 
ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support any of the proposed climate change 
Policy R.En. 
 
Ed. 
 
T.Ind. 
 
T.Fu. 
 
T.Ci. 
 
Fu.E. 
 
Pr. 
 
Mar. 
 
L.V.I 
Std. Error 
 Wald 
 Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
 
.826 
.621 
(.431) 
2.259 
 
.950 
3.399 
(.065) 
.173 
 
1.359 
4.865 
(027)** 
.050 
 
1.644 
8.920 
(.003)** 
.007 
 
2.291 
.1.819 
(.177) 
.046 
 
.829 
.662 
(.416) 
1.962 
 
1.216 
.779 
(.377) 
.342 
 
.888 
1.605 
(.205) 
.325 
A 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
Exp. (B) 
 
.010 
.232 
.630 
.995 
 
.011 
.178 
(.673) 
.996 
 
.015 
1.344 
(.246) 
1.018 
 
.018 
.171 
(.679) 
1.008 
 
.027 
4.053 
(.044)* 
.948 
 
.010 
4.055 
(.044)* 
1.020 
 
.014 
5.975 
(.015)* 
1.036 
 
.010 
1.055 
(.304) 
.990 
G 
Std. Error 
Wald   
Significance 
Exp. (B) 
 
.347 
3.485 
(.062) 
.524 
 
.316 
2.028 
(.154) 
.638 
 
.408 
1.944 
(.163) 
.566 
 
.484 
.008 
(.930) 
1.043 
 
.711 
.025 
(.875) 
1.118 
 
.293 
9.046 
(.003)** 
.414 
 
.389 
.025 
(.874) 
1.063 
 
.291 
9.235 
(.002)** 
.411 
P.O. 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
Exp. (B) 
 
.414 
.901 
(.343) 
.675 
 
.336 
.014 
(.905) 
.961 
 
.409 
8.129 
(.004)** 
.311 
 
.530 
8.645 
(.003)** 
.211 
 
.751 
.011 
(.917) 
.925 
 
.314 
5.852 
(.016)* 
.468 
 
.382 
7.435 
(.006)** 
.353 
 
.307 
4.569 
(.033)* 
.519 
C.H.B 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 
.138 
32.058 
(.000)** 
2.186 
 
.130 
48.958 
(.000)** 
2.481 
 
.199 
23.859 
(000)** 
2.645 
 
.339 
20.505 
(.000)** 
4.638 
 
.411 
5.678 
(.017)* 
2.660 
 
.116 
37.312 
(.000)** 
2.034 
 
.180 
29.404 
(.000)** 
2.647 
 
.122 
27.946 
(.000)** 
1.906 
D.B. 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 
.447 
6.911 
(.009)** 
3.236 
 
.312 
12.224 
(.000)** 
2.976 
 
. 409 
18.575 
(.000)** 
5.817 
 
.510 
5.233 
(.022)* 
3.208 
 
.806 
1.198 
(.180) 
2.946 
 
.315 
1.510 
.(219) 
1.473 
 
.374 
11.126 
(.001)** 
3.486 
 
.314 
.953 
.329 
1.359 
Constant 0.815 -2.291 -4.865 -7.842 -.4.340 -1.441 -6.791 -.082 
Negalkerke  
R2 
0.326 .460 .576 .590 .293 .384 .513 .349 
N 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 382 
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mitigation policies (Table 5-11). However, Se to climate change negatively impacts 
ranchers’ and farmers’ support for taxing gasoline and taxing citizens to mitigate climate 
change, but not their support for the rest of proposed mitigation policies. 
Age does not impact the willingness to support most of the proposed mitigation 
policies, except that it increases the willingness to support pressuring car companies to 
produce more fuel efficient vehicles and the government to ratify international protocols. 
Women and men have the same support for most policies except pressuring the car 
companies to produce more fuel-efficient vehicles and using market incentives to 
decrease the emissions of the industrial sectors as women are more supportive than men 
to those two policy options. Conservatives are less supportive for most policies except 
educating the public, developing renewable energy resources, and taxing citizens. 
Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change makes ranchers and farmers 
more willing to support all the policy options listed in the survey. Believing that climate 
change is a possible cause of the contemporary drought enhances ranchers’ and farmers’ 
willingness to support most policies except taxing citizens, pressuring car companies to 
produce more fuel efficient vehicles and using market incentives to decrease the 
greenhouse gases emissions of the industrial sector. 
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Table 5-11. Logit Regression Results Explaining Support of Climate Change Mitigation 
Policies Using a Model that Includes the Separated Components of Vulnerability. 
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
Policy R.En. Ed. T.Ind. T.Fu. T.Ci. Fu.E. Pr. Mar. 
P.V. 
 Std. Error 
  Wald 
Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
 
1.610 
.2.531 
(.112) 
12.955 
 
1.435 
.000 
(.996) 
0.993 
 
1.707 
.585 
(.444) 
3.692 
 
1.819 
.064 
(.800) 
1.584 
 
2.745 
.058 
(809) 
.516 
 
1.380 
.631 
(.427) 
2.993 
 
1.627 
2.952 
(.086) 
.061 
 
1.332 
.142 
(.706) 
1.653 
Ad.C. 
 Std. Error 
  Wald 
Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
 
.825 
.337 
(.561) 
.619 
 
.913 
.682 
(.409) 
2.126 
 
1.402 
.251 
(.617) 
.495 
 
1.800 
.062 
(.803) 
.639 
 
2.055 
.000 
.(988) 
1.031 
 
.818 
.015 
(.904) 
.906 
 
1.342 
.921 
(.337) 
.276 
 
.883 
.489 
(.484) 
1.854 
Se 
 Std. Error 
 Wald 
Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
 
.399 
2.333 
(.127) 
.544 
 
.434 
1.332 
(.248) 
.606 
 
.673 
5.564 
(018)* 
.204 
 
.903 
6.266 
.(012)* 
.104 
 
1.074 
.288 
(.591) 
.562 
 
.391 
.380 
(.538) 
1.273 
 
.608 
2.263 
(.133) 
.400 
 
.418 
.436 
(.509) 
1.759 
A 
 Std. Error 
 Wald 
Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
 
.010 
.271 
.602 
.995 
 
.011 
.183 
(.669) 
.995 
 
.016 
.333 
(.564) 
1.009 
 
.020 
.043 
(.835) 
.996 
 
.028 
3.612 
(.057) 
.948 
 
.010 
3.937 
(.047)* 
1.020 
 
.015 
5.566 
(.018)* 
1.036 
 
.010 
1.080 
(.299) 
.989 
G 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 
.353 
3.816 
(.051) 
.502 
 
.320 
1.965 
(.161) 
.638 
 
.415 
1.163 
(.281) 
.639 
 
.496 
.301 
(.583) 
1.313 
 
.693 
.307. 
(.580) 
.1.468 
 
.298 
9.082 
(.003)** 
.407 
 
.391 
.040 
(.841) 
1.081 
 
.295 
9.038 
(.003)** 
.411 
P.O. 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 
.418 
.499 
(.480) 
.744 
 
.341 
.014 
(.907) 
.961 
 
.425 
6.101 
(.014)* 
.350 
 
.529 
7.338 
(.007)** 
.239 
 
.744 
.219 
(.640) 
.706 
 
.318 
5.350 
(.021)* 
.479 
 
.396 
8.213 
(.004)** 
.321 
 
.312 
4.310 
(.038)* 
.523 
CC.B. 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 
.141 
32.671 
(.000)** 
2.234 
 
.130 
48.658 
(.000)** 
2.475 
 
.200 
22.967 
(000)** 
2.608 
 
.331 
20.071 
(.000)** 
4.398 
 
.386 
5.463 
(.019)* 
2.464 
 
.116 
37.250 
(.000)** 
2.034 
 
.183 
30.441 
(.000)** 
2.747 
 
.122 
27.595 
(.000)** 
1.898 
D.B. 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
Exp. (B) 
 
.448 
6.478 
(.011)* 
3.130 
 
.314 
12.377 
(.000)** 
3.013 
 
..413 
.17.559 
(.000)** 
5.641 
 
.512 
4.898 
(.027)* 
3.106 
 
.786 
2.114 
(.146) 
3.135 
 
.317 
1.510 
.(219) 
1.475 
 
.380 
11.233 
(.001)** 
3.575 
 
.315 
1.008 
.315 
1.373 
Constant 0.967 -2.436 -3.966 -6.590 -.4.217 -1.570 -5.820 -.278 
Negalkerke  
R2 
0.339 .462 .587 .594 .286 .388 .521 .353 
N 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 383 
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Analyzing the support for doing nothing as a national climate change mitigation policy 
shows that vulnerability to climate change is a significant determinant for supporting this 
choice. Those who are more vulnerable to climate change, or those who live in more 
water stressed area, more reliant on agriculture for living (more sensitive) and with less 
political power and financial resources (less Ad.C.), oppose doing nothing as a national 
climate change mitigation policy. The only other variable that is significant in 
determining ranchers’ and farmers’ support for doing nothing as a policy option is the 
belief regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change. Those who believe that 
climate change is anthropogenic are less supportive of this policy option.  
In summary, vulnerability to climate change decreases the support for doing 
nothing as a national policy facing climate change. At the same time, the majority of the 
vulnerable ranchers and farmers are less supportive of some perceived high cost policies 
including taxing gasoline and taxing corporates. Sensitivity is the only vulnerability 
component that shows significant influence on support of some mitigation policies. The 
ranchers and farmers who are more reliant on agriculture for income are less supportive 
of taxing gasoline or taxing corporates. Older ranchers and farmers are more supportive 
of certain policies such as pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient 
vehicles and pressuring the government to ratify international treaties, but less supportive 
of policies such as taxing citizens. Being conservative decreases ranchers’ and farmers’ 
support for many of the more costly mitigation policies. Believing in the anthropogenic 
causes of climate changes enhances ranchers’ and farmers’ support to all mitigation 
policies. Connecting the drought in Nevada to climate change increase ranchers’ and 
farmers’ support to most of the mitigation policies investigated. 
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Table 5-12. Logit Regression Results Explaining Support of Nothing as a Climate 
Change Policy Using Two Models: One Includes the Composite Vulnerability Index and 
Another Includes Its Components. 
The value of Exp. (B) shows the direction of impact of the interdependent variable on the dependent 
variable. If Exp. (B) is more than 1, then the impact of positive. If the Exp. (B) is less than one then 
the impact is negative. 
* Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
Parameter  Logistic Regression Results 
for Model 1 
(Vulnerability) 
Logistic Regression Results for  
Model 2  
(Vulnerability Components) 
L.V.I. Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
1.033 
3.851 
(.050)* 
.132 
 
P.V. Std. Error 
Wald 
 Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 1.868 
.444 
(.505) 
.288 
Se Std. Error 
 Wald 
  Significance 
  Exp. (B) 
 .495 
1.520 
(.218) 
.543 
Ad.C. Std. Error 
 Wald 
 Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
 1.038 
.585 
(.444) 
2.213 
A Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
.013 
1.816 
(.178) 
0983 
.013 
1.844 
(.174) 
0.983 
G Std.  Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
   Exp. (B) 
.478 
1.969 
(.161) 
1.956 
.483 
2.013 
(.156) 
1.984 
P.O. Std. Error 
 Wald 
 Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
1.054 
3.769 
(.052) 
7.736 
1.058 
3.674 
(.055) 
7.595 
C.H.B . 
Std. Error 
Wald 
Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
.305 
31.922 
(.000)** 
.263 
.237 
32.017 
(.000)** 
(.262) 
D.B. Std. Error 
  Wald 
  Significance 
 Exp. (B) 
.554 
.742 
(.389) 
.620 
.554 
.706 
(.401) 
.628 
 Constant -1.317 -.885 
 Negalkerke R2 .384 .382 
 N 383 383 
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CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
6.1 Risk Perception 
As can be seen in the results chapter, Vulnerability to climate change as a 
function of P.V., Se and Ad.C. does not impact climate change risk perception on any 
risk target ranging from self and family to future generations and plants and trees (Table 
6-1). The regression analyses show that in all cases except for the risk perception on 
oneself, family and the U.S., the failure of vulnerability to impose impact on risk 
perception is the result of the failure of any of its three components (P.V., Se and Ad.C.) 
to be a determinant of risk perception.  
Investigating the determinants of risk perception on oneself, family and the U.S 
expose a more complex picture. In those cases, vulnerability to climate change is not a 
significant determinant of risk perception because its components significantly act in 
contradicting direction. In the case of risk perception on oneself and family, P.V. or 
living in a more water stressed areas decreases risk perception, while Se or ascending 
reliance on agriculture for livelihood increases risk perception. Ad.C., or increased status 
and income, has no impact on risk perception in those two cases. Accordingly, the effects 
of Se and P.V. on risk perception regarding climate change impacts on oneself and family 
cancel out each other and make the composite vulnerability index become insignificant. 
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Table 6-1: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Risk Perception. 
Determinant Influence 
Vulnerability (L.V.I.) No impact on any risk target. 
Physical Vulnerability 
(P.V.) 
Decreases risk perception on oneself, family and the U.S., and does not 
impact risk perception on any of the other risk targets. 
Sensitivity (Se) Increases risk perception on oneself, family and the wealthy countries, 
and does not impact risk perception on any of the other risk targets. 
Adaptive Capacity (Ad.C.) No impact on any risk target. 
Age (A) Decreases risk perception on oneself, but does not impact risk 
perception on any other risk target. 
Gender (G) Women perceive the risk of climate change higher on the least wealthy 
countries. But they perceive the risk of climate change the same as 
men on all other risk targets. 
Political Orientation (P.O.) Conservatives perceive the risk of climate change lower than others on 
all risk targets except oneself and family. 
Climate Change Beliefs 
(CC.B.) 
Increase risk perception on all risk targets. 
Drought Beliefs (D.B.) Increase risk perception on all risk targets. 
 
 In the case of perception of risk on the U.S., P.V. decreases risk perception 
(significant at 5% interval) and Ad.C. increases risk perception (significant at 10% 
interval). It seems that the positive impact of Ad.C. cancels out the negative impact of 
P.V. and made the vulnerability index insignificant again. 
While there is no literature that explains the impact of vulnerability, Se and Ad.C. 
on risk perception, Brody et al. (2008) discussed the impact of different types of P.V. on 
climate change risk perception. They found that different types of physical vulnerabilities 
impose different impacts on risk perception. For example, living closer to the beach, thus 
being more vulnerable to sea level rise risk, increase risk perception, living in 100 –year 
flood Plains, thus being more vulnerable to increased weather extremes and fresh water 
floods, decreases risk perception, while living in areas with increasing forest fires does 
not affect risk perception.  
Consequently, drought as a climate change risk can be one of those risks that 
impose negative impacts on climate change risk perception. This might be due to the fact 
that drought is natural component of the climate cycle in Nevada and the U.S. Southwest. 
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Smith (2000) listed drought as a “creeping hazard” because it takes place over a long 
period of time and because it is hard to determine its severity.  Living in a drought prone 
area for decades, adapting to it and surviving it repeatedly may make ranchers and 
farmers exaggerate their fitness to deal with droughts when they take place and 
underestimate the possible extent of their severity.  
 (Beamish 2002, p.4) identifies troubles that take place progressively and 
gradually as “crescive troubles”. In dealing with those troubles people tend to ignore, 
avoid or undermine such troubles till the troubles reach their tipping points and manifest 
themselves through acute and catastrophic events. Climate change seems to be one of 
those troubles. Ranchers and farmers living in more stressed areas may have become used 
to living with drought and have grown self confidence in their surviving abilities. 
Consequently, they have become even less concerned about drought as climate change 
impact than others who live in better off areas. 
On the other hand, those ranchers and farmers who are more sensitive to climate 
change impacts are more concerned on climate change impacts on themselves and 
families than others. This agree with my hypotheses as those who are more reliant on 
agriculture for living are more interested in keeping their jobs viable and profitable and 
thus more concerned about the impact of drought than those whom most of their income 
originate from other sources than agriculture. The more reliant a rancher or a famer on 
agriculture is, the more concerned she/he is about water rights and the possible increase 
in water cost imposed by the drought.  
However, Ad.C. seems to be insignificant or at best a very weak determinant of 
risk perception on any risk target. One more time, this might be due to the progressive, 
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slow and accumulative nature of drought as climate change impact. Such characteristics 
may make the difference in political power (social status) or resources availability and 
accessibility (income and wealth) less important or decisive in ranchers’ and farmers’ 
response to climate change imposed drought and thus make its impact on risk perception 
idle till the drought problem reaches a tipping point and so those who are more powerful 
and more resourceful will be more able to survive, adapt to, and avoid the worst impacts 
of that situation. 
The results of both correlation tests and regression analyses show that age is an 
insignificant determinant of climate change risk perception. This agrees with the Sunblad, 
Biel and Galing (2007) findings. The bivariate correlation tests show that being female 
correlate positively with risk perception on all risk targets, but the regression analyses 
show that the impact of gender on risk perception becomes insignificant when other 
determinants are considered in the models (Table 6-2). Gender appears to be a weak 
determinant of risk perception. This agrees with studies conducted by Sunblad, Biel and 
Galing (2007), Leiserowitz (2006) and Semenza et al. (2008) concluding that females are 
more concerned about climate change.  
The correlation tests show that being conservative decreases risk perception on all 
risk targets. Also, the regression analyses establish that being conservative decreases risk 
perception on all risk targets except oneself and family. The impact of political 
orientation on risk perception is well established in the literature (O’Connor, Bord and 
Fisher 1999, Leiserowitz 2006, 2005, 2003; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Dietz and Shwom 
2007). 
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Table 6-2: Summarized Results of the Influence of Gender on Risk Perception and 
Environmental Behavior. 
Dependent Variable Correlation Analyses Results Regression Analysis Results 
Risk Perception Being a women correlates 
positively with risk perception on 
all risk targets 
Women perceive the risk higher 
only on the least wealthy nations 
only 
Willingness to Act Individually Being a woman correlates 
positively with willing to increase 
the amount of house insulation,  
use more fuel efficient vehicles, 
and negatively with the willing to 
do nothing about climate change  
No impact of gender  
Support of climate change 
policies 
Being a woman correlates 
positively with supporting policies 
such as developing renewable 
energy, educating the public about 
climate change, taxing industries, 
pressuring car companies to 
increase fuel efficiency, 
pressuring governments to ratify 
the international protocols and 
using market incentives to 
decrease industrial emissions 
Women are more supportive 
than men of pressuring car 
companies to produce more fuel 
efficient vehicles and using 
market incentives and pollution 
trading mechanisms to reduce 
industrial emissions as climate 
change mitigation policies. But, 
gender does not impact the 
willingness to support any of the 
other policies 
 
The most important determinant of climate change risk perception on all risk 
targets is beliefs regarding the causes of climate change. All the correlation tests and 
multiple regression analyses show that those who believe in the anthropogenic causes of 
climate change perceive the risk of climate change higher than those who do not.  
Even though, vulnerability to climate change impacts does not affect risk 
perception, yet connecting such impacts to climate change increases risk perception on all 
risk targets indiscriminately. The role of believing in climate change as a possible cause 
of the contemporary drought in Nevada is evident in the results of all correlation tests and 
regression analyses conducted in this research to explore the determinants of risk 
perception. 
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6.2 Environmental Behavior 
Neither vulnerability nor its components are determinants of the willingness to 
mitigate climate change at the individual level (Table 6-3). Both the bivariate correlations 
tests and the logistic regression analyses show that vulnerability to climate change is not 
a decisive factor in determining ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in any of 
the climate mitigation options investigated in this research. Also, the bivariate analyses 
establish that none of the components of vulnerability to climate change correlates with 
willingness to engage in any of the climate change mitigation actions investigated except 
for planting trees and using more fuel efficient vehicles, as those who are more sensitive 
to climate change are less willing to engage in both of these two actions. The logistic 
regression analyses show no impact of any of the components of vulnerability on the 
willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change. 
Table 6-3: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Willingness to Act Individually to 
Mitigate Climate Change. 
Determinant Influence 
L.V.I. No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
P.V. No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
Se No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
Ad.C. No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
A Decreases the willingness to plant trees and use public transportation, but does not 
impact the willingness to engage in any of the other actions. 
G No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
P.O. No impact on the willingness to engage in any individual action. 
CC.B. Increases the willingness to engage in all individual actions mitigating climate 
change. 
D.B. Increases the willingness to increase the amount of insulation and install low-energy 
light bulbs in house, but does not impact the willingness to engage in any of the other 
individual actions. 
 
When it comes to supporting climate change mitigation policies, the picture 
becomes a little different (Table 6-4). The correlation analysis and the logistic regression 
analyses show that vulnerability to climate change decreases ranchers’ and farmers’ 
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support to taxing fuel and taxing corporates as policy options, but does not impact their 
support for other options. However, those who are more vulnerable to climate change are 
less supportive of doing nothing as a national policy option. The correlation tests reveal 
that P.V. positively correlates with the increased support of all the climate change 
mitigation options, Ad.C. does not correlate with supporting any of the policy options, 
but Se to climate change decreases the willingness to support taxing fuel and pressuring 
the government to ratify international protocols. The logistic regression analyses reveal 
that only Se significantly impacts ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to support taxing 
fuel and taxing corporates as policy options. 
Table 6-4: Summarized Results of the Determinants of Supporting Climate Change 
Mitigation Policies. 
Determinant Influence 
L.V.I. Decreases support to taxing industries, taxing fuel and doing nothing as climate 
change policies, and does not affect all other choices. It also decreases support for 
doing nothing as a climate change policy. 
P.V. No impact on the willingness to support any climate change mitigation policy. 
Se Decreases support to taxing industries and taxing fuel as climate change mitigation 
policies and does not impact support to any other policy. 
Ad.C. No impact on the willingness to support any climate change mitigation policy. 
A Decreases the willingness to support taxing citizens and increase the support to 
pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and pressuring the 
U.S. government to ratify international protocols as climate change mitigation 
policies. But, age does not impact the willingness to support any of the other policies. 
G Women are more supportive than men of pressuring car companies to produce more 
fuel efficient vehicles and using market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms 
to reduce industrial emissions as climate change mitigation policies. But, gender does 
not impact the willingness to support any of the other policies 
P.O. Conservatives are less supportive than others of all climate change mitigation policies 
except developing renewable energy resources, and educating the public on human 
causes of climate change and doing nothing. 
CC.B. Increases the willingness to support all climate change mitigation policies. 
D.B. Increases support to climate change mitigation policies except taxing citizens for 
climate change mitigation and pressuring car companies to produce more fuel 
efficient cars and doing nothing. 
 
These results disagree with my hypotheses as they show that vulnerable ranchers 
and farmers are indifferent regarding their willingness to do any individual actions to 
mitigate climate change or support of climate change mitigation policies. Even more, 
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vulnerability to climate change decreases support for some policies that are perceived as 
being costly. Yet, vulnerability to climate change makes people less willing to accept 
doing nothing as a governmental policy. These results show that the more vulnerable 
ranchers and farmers are, the more they want to avoid climate change (not supporting 
doing nothing), However, the results show that the more the farmers and ranchers are 
vulnerable, the more they are unwilling to do something themselves to mitigate climate 
change, so they are either indifferent or opponent of mitigation individual actions and 
national policies that require financial or other sacrifices in the form of taxes or increased 
prices of goods.  
There is no literature investigating the impact of vulnerability, Se and Ad.C. on 
environmental behavior. Zahran et al. (2006) investigated the impacts of different 
physical vulnerabilities on supporting climate change mitigation policies. Zahran et al 
(2006) found that different types of physical vulnerabilities impact policy support in 
different ways. While people who live in areas with increasing temperature support are 
more willing to support climate change mitigation policies than those who haven’t 
observed such a trend, people who live in areas closer to the beach are less supportive for 
climate change mitigation policies. People who live in areas with higher natural hazards 
imposing casualties support adopting climate change mitigation policies the same way as 
others. My results indicate that living in a more water availability stressed area either a 
weak or negative determinant of the willingness to support climate change mitigation 
policies similar to living in an area with higher hazardous risk casualties or increasing 
temperature. 
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Again the natures of climate change as a “crescive trouble” and drought as being a 
“creeping hazard” and a natural part of the climate cycle of Nevada apparently make 
ranchers and farmers perceive the short term costs of acting to mitigate climate higher 
than the long term benefits of avoiding climate change and its impacts ((Beamish 2002; 
Smith 2000). That explains why the more vulnerable ranchers and farmers support taking 
action to mitigate climate change, but do not support actions that might impose cost at the 
personal level such as taxing gasoline and corporations.  
Age does not impact the willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change 
except in the cases of planting trees and use public transportation as those who are 
younger tend to be more willing to engage in such action than the older ones. On the 
other hand, older ranchers and farmers are more supportive of pressuring care companies 
to produce more fuel efficient vehicles and ratifying international protocols as mitigation 
policies, but less supportive to using market incentives to decrease the industrial 
greenhouse gases emissions, and idle regarding the support of the other policy options. 
The confusing role of gender impact on environmental behavior agrees with the 
confusion in literature as can be seen in Sunblad, Biel and Galing (2007), O’Connor et al. 
(2002), O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999), Semenza et al. (2006).  
The results of the correlation tests show that being a woman only correlates with 
individual actions such as increasing the amount of insulation at home, and using more 
fuel efficient vehicles, but being a woman positively correlate with supporting all the 
national mitigation policy options except for doing nothing where men support this 
option more than woman, and taxing fuel and citizens were there is no correlation 
between gender and support of those policies (Table 6-2). The logistic regression 
 120
analyses show that gender is not a determinant of the willingness to engage in any of the 
individual actions options specified in the research.  
The regression analyses also reveal that women and men have the same support 
for the different climate change mitigation options investigated except for pressuring the 
car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles, and using market incentives to 
decrease the industrial greenhouse gases emissions, where women are more supportive of 
these options than men. Such a weak and variant (from option to option) role of gender 
agree with the finding of O’Connor et al. (2002) and O’Connor, Bord and Fisher (1999). 
The correlation tests show that conservatives are less willing to engage in all the 
individual actions listed, and less supportive of all the national climate mitigation options 
investigated. Conservatives are more supportive of doing nothing as a mitigation 
individual action and a national policy options. But, the role of political orientation in 
explaining the willingness to act individually to mitigate climate change disappears in the 
logistic regression analyses results. But being conservative sustains its negative impact on 
the willingness to support most of the national policy options except for developing more 
renewable energy resources, educating the public regarding the causes of climate change, 
and taxing citizens.  The impact of political orientation may became muted in some of my 
results because it (political orientation) sometimes act indirectly through impacting the 
beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate change as can be seen in Table (6-
5). The role of political orientation is strongly evident in the literature on environmental 
behavior related to climate change (O’Connor, Bord and Fisher 1999, Leiserowitz 2006, 
2005, 2003; Slimak and Dietz 2006; Dietz and Shwom 2007).  
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Believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change is the one most 
prominent factor in increasing ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage of all the 
individual actions listed and making them less accepting of doing nothing as a choice. 
The same applies for the willingness to support climate change mitigation policies. Those 
who believe in the anthropogenic causes of climate change are more supportive than 
others to all the policy options and less supportive of doing nothing as a policy option. 
The prominence of believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate change as a decisive 
factor in climate change related environmental behavior of ranchers and farmers is 
consistent in all the correlation tests and logistic regression analyses.  
The bivariate tests show that believing in climate change as a possible cause of 
the contemporary drought in Nevada is positivity associated with the willingness to do all 
the individual actions options listed and support all the national mitigation policies 
investigated except for doing nothing, where the correlation becomes negative. The 
regression analyses show that believing in climate change as possible cause of climate 
change increases people support to most of the national policies investigated except for 
taxing citizens and pressuring care companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles. 
But, connecting climate change to the drought in Nevada does not impact supporting 
nothing as national policy to face climate change. On the other hand, the regression 
analyses show that believing in climate change as a cause of the current drought in 
Nevada does not impact ranchers’ and farmers’ willingness to engage in any of the 
climate change mitigation actions investigated except for the increasing the insulation at 
home and installing the fuel-efficient light bulbs. 
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The more people (in this case ranchers and farmers) believe that human activity is 
a significant cause of climate change the more they become concerned about its impacts 
and are more willing to act individually and nationally to mitigate climate change. 
Consequently, making more efforts to communicate the science of greenhouse gases 
effect on the climate and clarifying the thin line between what is natural climate change, 
and what is anthropogenic climate change help make people more sensitive towards 
climate change consequences. Yet, it is important to understand that believing in the 
anthropogenic causes of climate change is a function of other things than knowledge 
(Table 6-5). Both females and non-conservatives are more accepting of the anthropogenic 
causes of climate change than males and conservatives. Neither vulnerability nor any of 
its components are determinants of believing in the anthropogenic causes of climate 
change. 
This agrees with Hamilton (2010) findings. Hamilton (2010) stated that climate 
change is becoming more and more a value laden issue disconnected from reality and the 
immune to any increase in the amount and quality of climate change related scientific 
knowledge.  He also stated that the gap between democrats and republicans regarding 
their beliefs about climate change has increased from 4 percent in 1997, to 34% in 2008 
(Hamiliton 2010). 
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Table 6-5. OLS Regression Results Explaining Beliefs Regarding Climate Change 
Anthropogenic Causes. 
Variable The Model with  Separated 
Vulnerability Indices (N=383) 
The Model with the Composite 
Vulnerability Index (N=382) 
Intercept 4.486 
(.436)** 
4.528 
(.381)** 
L.V.I.  -.178 
(.396) 
P.V. -.605 
(.612) 
 
Se -.104 
(.190) 
 
Ad.C. .016 
(.399) 
 
A -.000 
(.005) 
.000 
(.005) 
G -.513 
(.143)** 
-.514 
(.143)** 
P.O. -1.374 
(.147)** 
-1.407 
(.143)** 
Adjusted R2 .250 .249 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 5% level. 
**Significant at the 10% level. 
 
Connecting climate change to its impacts or in this case drought affects people’s 
risk perception on all risk targets and enhance their willingness to do or support many 
individually mitigation actions and national mitigation policies. This agrees with Brody et 
al.’s (2007, 90) suggestion that communicating climate change impacts on smaller 
geographical scales (downscaling of climate change models) and providing more precise 
information on such impacts increase sensitivity to climate change consequences.  
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CHAPTER7 
CONCLUSION 
Vulnerability to climate change as function of physical vulnerability, sensitivity 
and adaptive capacity does not impact climate change risk perception and willingness to 
engage in climate change individual actions. When it comes to support of climate change 
mitigation policies, those who are more vulnerable to climate change are less supportive 
of doing nothing about climate change, yet they are also less supportive of costly 
mitigation policies that involve taxing gasoline or corporations.  
Physical vulnerability or living in a more water stressed area decreases risk 
perception only on those risk targets that are close to people (in this case ranchers and 
farmers) such as oneself and family, while Se to climate change or more reliance on 
agriculture for living increases risk perception on those targets. Adaptive capacity does 
not influence risk perception at all. Physical vulnerability and adaptive capacity are not -- 
or at best a weak -- determinant of environmental behavior including willingness to take 
individual actions and support national policies to mitigate climate change. Sensitivity 
does not impact environmental behavior at the individual level, but it decreases ranchers’ 
and farmers’ support to climate change mitigation policies that involve taxation. 
The fact that vulnerability affects the attitude towards risks such as air pollution 
or hurricane, but not climate change may be attributed to the fact that climate change is a 
“crescive trouble” (Beamish 2002, 4). “Crescive troubles”, similar to “creeping hazards,” 
are those which accumulate and grow over time. People tend to ignore, avoid or 
undermine such troubles, until the troubles reach their tipping points and manifest 
themselves through acute and catastrophic events (Gordon and Suzuki 1990). 
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The most important factor that determines peoples’ risk perception and behaviors 
within the climate change milieu is their belief about the causes of climate change. One 
other strong factor is the perceived connection of climate change to its possible impacts at 
the local level. The more people believe in the anthropogenic causes of climate change 
and the more they connect the weather extremes they encounter in their environment to 
climate change, the more they perceive climate change risk, and support taking actions to 
mitigate it. Political orientation is another important determinant, as it affects peoples’ 
risk perceptions and behaviors either directly, or indirectly through affecting their beliefs 
regarding the causes of climate change. Other factors such as age and gender impose less 
consistent impacts compared to political orientation and beliefs. 
 Among the U.S. citizens, there is substantial disagreement regarding the reality 
of climate change and its potential impacts, and thus, there is highly uneven support for 
climate change mitigation policies. Such disagreement stems primarily from variations in 
the values, beliefs and worldviews prevailing among the U.S. general public. For any 
effective communication of climate change science, there is a need for reestablishing 
climate change as a scientific and environmental reality that does not belong to a certain 
political or ideological agenda.     
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APPENDIX 1 
 
CLIMATE CHANGEVSURVEY FOR FARMERS AND RANCHERS  
 
  
Fallon, Nevada. Example of a Great Basin Curvilinear 
Petroglyph etched into a rock about 2-3000 years ago. 
The abstract form indicates that the artist had a 
Sophisticated artistic sense. People who lived here 
fished and hunted in Lake Lahontan, which is now dry. 
(Source:  http://www.jimpowers.com/ptrglph4.htm) 
 
The purpose of this survey is to gather information on the perspectives Nevada ranchers and 
farmers regarding climate change.  The reason that we are conducting this survey is to help 
researchers in our National Science Foundation-funded research project at UNLV, UNR and DRI, 
as well as natural resource managers in Nevada, better understand Nevada’s ranchers and 
farmers’ perceptions of climate change.  This will aid researchers and managers in understanding 
how to best connect with Nevada ranching and farming communities regarding climate change.  
This is why this survey asks about your concerns, perceptions, and knowledge.  The survey will 
take approximately 20 minutes to complete.  The responses you provide are very much 
appreciated, and will be kept confidential.  Should you have any concerns about the way the 
survey has been conducted, please contact Dr. William James Smith, Jr. at the School of 
Environmental and Public Affairs at UNLV at bill.smith@unlv.edu and (702) 895-4440, or 
contact the UNLV Institutional Review Board at OPRSHumansubjects@unlv.edu and (702) 895-
2794.  
Thank you very much for your time and effort during this busy holiday season! 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---------- 
Demographic Information 
This section assesses the participant’s basic demographic information. 
 
1. Age ______ 
 
2. Gender 
            Female                                   Male            
 
3. Marital status  
      Single                                    Married                           Divorced                               
Widowed 
 
4. Closest two roads that cross near your home (otherwise, please provide a 9 digit zip code). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Closest two roads that cross near your ranch/farm (otherwise, please provide a 9 digit zip 
code). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Education level 
Middle school                                      High school diploma or GED 
 Some college                                                                2-year college degree     
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      4-year college degree                                                     Master’s degree 
      Advanced professional degree such as MD or JD         Doctoral degree  
           
7. If married, please indicate the education level of your spouse.  
Middle school                                     High school diploma or GED 
 Some college                                                               2-year college degree of GED  
             4-year college degree                                                    Master’s degree 
      Advanced professional degree such as MD or JD        Doctoral degree  
 
8. Type of agricultural activity. 
□ Farming                                     Ranching  
□ Both                                           Others including 
______________________________________ 
 
9. Type of livestock. Please check all applicable and estimate totals as best as possible. 
□ Cattle          total#__________                Horses        total#__________     
□ Chicken      total#__________                 Pigs           total#__________   
□ Sheep          total#_________                  Turkey       total#__________  
□ Others such as _________________________________________________ 
total#____________ 
 
10. Type of vegetable farming activity. Check all that apply. 
      For sale for human consumption                                     For sale as livestock feed 
            Food for your own livestock                                            Food for yourself and/or your 
family                       
 
11. Total area of farming land (in acres) _______________. 
 
12. Total area of grazing land (in acres) _______________. 
 
13. Please, as best as you can, indicate the percentage of your ranch/farm’s annual income that 
comes from livestock/ranching. 
□ 0-.9%                                            1-9%                                              10-19% 
□ 20-29%                                         30-39%                                          40-49% 
□ 50-59%                                         60-69%                                          70-79%     
□ 80-89%                                         90-99%                                          100% 
 
14. Please, as best as you can, indicate the percentage of your ranch/farm’s annual income that 
comes from growing crops. 
□ 0-.9%                                            1-9%                                              10-19% 
□ 20-29%                                         30-39%                                          40-49% 
□ 50-59%                                         60-69%                                          70-79%     
□ 80-89%                                         90-99%                                         100% 
 
15. Ranch or farm net income per year (after expenses). 
□ $0-25,000                                     $25,001-50,000                              $50,001-100,000    
□ $100,001-150,000                        $150,001-200,000                          $200,001-300,000 
□ $300,001-400,000                        $400,001-500,000                          $500,001-600,000 
□ $600,001-700,000                        $700,001-800,000                          $800,001-900,000 
□ $900,001-1,000,000                     More than $1,000,000 
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16. If the household income is different from the ranch/farm’s income, please, as best as you can, 
estimate the total net household income within the following ranges. 
□ $0-25,000                                     $20,001-50,000                              $50,001-100,000    
□ $100,001-150,000                        $150,001-200,000                          $200,001-300,000 
□ $300,001-400,000                        $400,001-500,000                          $500,001-600,000 
□ $600,001-700,000                        $700,001-800,000                          $800,001-900,000 
□ $900,001-1,000,000                     More than $1,000,000 
 
17. Number of household members ___________. 
 
18. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) ___________. 
 
19. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) working on the 
ranch/farm_________. 
 
20. Number of adult household members (18 years or older) having other jobs____. Check all 
that apply, including spouse. 
□ Agriculture and related industries 
o Farming to provide food for family 
o Farming commercially 
o Forestry and logging  
o Fishing commercially 
o Hunting and fishing are primary sources of food for family 
o Other ________________________________ 
□ Private industries  
o Construction 
o Education  
o Financial activities (e.g. banking, stock market, etc.) 
o Health services   
o Information 
o Leisure and hospitality (e.g. hotel, casino, etc.) 
o Manufacturing 
o Mining 
o Professional and business services (e.g. attorney, business consultant, etc.) 
o Retail trade 
o Transportation and utilities 
o Wholesale trade  
o Other ________________________________ 
□ Government 
o Federal 
o State 
o Local 
□ Unpaid family worker (e.g. homemaker)   
□ Unemployed 
 
21. Political party identification 
            Republican                                      Democrat 
            Independent                                    Other party ________________  
     No party/no interest in politics 
 
22. Are you registered to vote in state or federal elections?   
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□ Yes                              No                               Unsure 
 
23. Political orientation 
            Very liberal                                    Somewhat liberal                            Middle of the road 
            Somewhat conservative                 Very conservative 
 
24. What role should the government play in the economy? 
            A very minimal role                       A moderate role                              A very large role 
            
25. Please mark how strongly you feel about the following statement. Property rights should 
guarantee the right to do whatever you want on your own land. 
            Strongly disagree                           Disagree                                          Neutral 
            Agree                                             Strongly agree 
Consideration of Future Consequences 
This section will assess whether the participant is future-oriented or present-oriented.  
 
26. For each of the statements below, please indicate whether or not the statement is 
characteristic of you. If the statement is extremely uncharacteristic of you (not at all like you) 
please fill-in a "1" on the answer sheet; if the statement is extremely characteristic of you 
(very much like you) please fill-in a "5" on the answer sheet. Please use the numbers in the 
middle if you fall between the extremes.  
 
     Extremely              Somewhat            Neutral                Somewhat                    Extremely 
 uncharacteristic          uncharacteristic                                characteristic               characteristic                                 
       1-----------------------------2---------------    3--------------------4-----------------------------5 
 
A) _____I consider how things might be in the future, and try to influence those things with my 
day-to-day behavior. 
 
B) _____I often engage in a particular behavior in order to achieve outcomes that may not occur 
for 2-3 years. 
 
C) _____I am willing to sacrifice my immediate happiness or well-being in order to achieve 
future outcomes. 
 
D) _____I think it is important to take warnings about negative outcomes seriously, even if the 
negative outcome will not occur for many years to come. 
 
E) _____I generally ignore warnings about possible future environmental problems because I 
think the problems will be resolved by technology before they reach crisis level . 
  
F) _____My day-to-day work is far more important to me than behavior that has important but 
distant consequences. 
  
G) _____My behavior is only influenced by the immediate (e.g. days and weeks) concerns and 
outcomes of my actions, letting the future take care of itself. 
 
 
General Understanding and Perceptions 
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This section assesses participants’ knowledge about climate change in order to help us better 
exchange information with the public.  
 
27. Recently, you may have noticed that climate change has been gaining increasing attention in 
the news.  Have you personally listened to, watched, or read reports about climate change?  
□ Yes  please indicate if mostly TV, Internet, radio, others __________________________ 
□ No 
 
28. Briefly, assuming you believe in climate change, what do you think are the causes of it? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. How high a priority should climate change be to the U.S. government?   
Top priority                                   High priority                                    Medium priority 
Low priority                                  Not a priority 
 
30. Please evaluate the following statements and give your opinion using the scale below. 
 
Strongly disagree          Disagree               Not decided              Agree                     Strongly agree 
1------------------------- 2-----------------------3--------------------4----------------------------5 
 
A) ____ I believe that we are in a period of climate change.  
B) ____ I believe that climate change occurs naturally over time. 
C) ____ I believe that human activity has not been playing a significant role in recent climate 
change. 
D) ____ I believe that human activity has been playing a significant role in recent climate 
change. 
E) ____ I believe that human activity has been the only factor that has produced climate 
change. 
 
31. Which one of the following statements do you believe is correct? 
□ Most scientists think climate change is happening. 
□ Most scientists think climate change is not happening. 
□ There is a lot of disagreement among scientists about whether or not climate change is 
happening. 
□ Scientists agree that climate change is happening, and many believe human activities are 
playing a significant role in it. 
□ Scientists agree that climate change is happening, but many believe human activities are 
not playing any significant role in it. 
□ Do not know enough to say. 
 
32. Please indicate if you think the following statements are True (T), False (F), or you are 
Unsure (U).  In sub-sections B through I the statements refer to at least some, but not 
necessarily all, parts of the world.   
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                  T = True        F = False                                         U = Unsure  
A) _____Scientists expect global temperatures to rise at least into the near future.  
B) _____Scientists expect ocean levels to rise due to climate change. 
C) _____Scientists expect more frequent droughts due to climate change. 
D) _____Scientists expect problems with food supply due to climate change. 
E) _____Scientists expect increases in disease due to climate change. 
F) _____Scientists expect mass extinction of species due to climate change. 
G) _____Scientists expect heavy damage to forests due to climate change. 
H) _____Scientists expect significant damage to coral reefs due to climate change. 
I) _____Scientists expect more extreme droughts, floods and storms such as hurricanes due to 
climate change. 
 
Concerns and Mitigation 
This section assesses the participants’ perceptions of potential conflict due to climate change that 
leads to 
social, economic and biophysical impacts. Moreover, it assesses their acceptance of adopting 
climate change mitigation policies. 
 
33. Using the scale below, please indicate to what extent you are concerned about the following 
areas possibly being impacted by climate change in Nevada. 
 
Not at all concerned       Somewhat concerned        Moderately concerned        Very concerned 
1--------------------------------2--------------------------------3----------------------------4 
A) _____ Economy 
B) _____ Ecosystem degradation (e.g. forests, fisheries, wetlands) 
C) _____ Extreme weather events (e.g. floods, storms, droughts) 
D) _____ Farming livelihood 
E) _____ Food availability 
F) _____ Irrigation for crops 
G) _____Impacts on resorts and other businesses related to outdoor leisure activity 
H) _____Impacts on small businesses 
I)  _____ Impacts on farmers, and people who often hunt and fish 
J) _____ Public health 
K) _____ Precipitation for crops   
L) _____ Residential water supply availability 
 
34. How important is the issue of climate change to you personally? 
Not at all important                       Somewhat important 
       Very important                              Extremely important 
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35. Please use the scale below to indicate how much you think climate change will negatively 
impact the following.  
A) _____You personally 
B) _____Your family 
C) _____Your surrounding ranching/farming community 
D) _____People in the United States 
E) _____People in other modern industrialized countries 
F) _____People in least-wealthy countries 
G) _____Future generations of people 
H) _____Plant and animal species 
 
36. When do you think climate change will begin harming people in your ranching/farming 
community? 
            Never                                              They are being harmed now           In 10 years 
     In 25 years                                       In 50 years                                      In 100 years 
     Not sure 
37. If you believe that climate change is occurring, please answer this question.  In your opinion, 
how might climate change harm your family and business?  What information might help you 
cope? 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
38. What of the following are you willing and able to do about climate change to reduce its 
impacts? Please check as many as you would adopt. 
□ Increase the amount of insulation in your home to decrease your energy consumption. 
□ Install low-energy light bulbs in your house. 
□ Plant more trees near your home. 
□ Use public transportation more than you do now.  
□ Use more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
□ Nothing 
□ Others 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
39. At the national level, which of the following policies and initiatives would you support to 
help reduce climate change? Check as many as you would support. 
□ Develop renewable energy resources such as wind, solar and geothermal.  
□ Educate the public, including through schools, on human causes of climate change. 
 Not at all                  Only a little             A moderate amount            A great deal                Don’t 
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□ Impose taxes on corporations/industries that contribute to climate change for climate 
change mitigation, understanding that this might translate into increased prices of some 
goods. 
□ Impose taxes on fossil fuels (gasoline) for climate change mitigation, understanding that 
this might translate into higher gasoline prices. 
□ Impose taxes on citizens for climate change mitigation. 
□ Pressuring car companies to produce more fuel efficient vehicles. 
□ Pressuring the U.S. government to ratify international protocols which commit the U.S. to 
fast reduction of carbon emissions. 
□ Use market incentives and pollution trading mechanisms to reduce industrial emissions. 
□ Nothing 
□ Others __________________________________________________________________ 
 
Local Impacts and Concerns 
This section assesses the participants’ perceptions and possible exposure to current climate 
change impacts. Moreover it assesses the participants’ coping strategies regarding such impacts.  
 
40. Nevada and other states that rely on the Colorado River are facing a severe drought since 
2000. Which of the following contributes to this drought in your opinion? Please check as 
many as you feel are related to the drought. 
□ Climate change 
□ Natural variability in precipitation 
□ Pollution 
□ Over-consumption of water 
□ Over-production of greenhouse gases 
□ Other causes such as ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
41. Has this drought affected you and your business? If so, then please explain how. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. Has this drought affected your fellow ranchers and farmers in Nevada? If so, then please 
explain how. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
43. Have you noticed the following changes in your local environment? Please check all that 
apply. 
□ Increased temperature in (check any below) 
o Summer 
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o Spring 
o Winter 
o Fall 
□ Changes in fish communities (e.g. decrease of certain fish types or volume) 
□ Changes in forest composition or grazing area (shift in location and health of trees) 
□ Changes in productive hunting seasons 
□ Decrease of certain game animals and/or their predators 
□ Decreases in insect numbers (e.g. for food)  
□ Decreases in snow packs 
□ Earlier melting and runoff of snow packs  
□ Increases in related diseases  
□ Increases in insect numbers or insect related damage 
□ Increased soil dryness 
□ Increased wildfire (frequency or severity) 
□ Less surface water in lakes and rivers 
□ Less water flow from springs  
□ Others__________________________________________________________________ 
 
44. If you noticed any of the above, please describe, and explain what you think the causes are. 
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
If you noticed any of the above in #43, how do such changes impact you and your family or 
others? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX 2 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
Variable 
N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Deviation
Vulnerability (L.V.I.) 399 -.29 .46 .12 .16
Physical vulnerability (P.V.) 458 .00 .50 .113 .10
Sensitivity (Se) 425 .00 1.00 .58 .36
Adaptive capacity (Ad.C.) 417 .01 .96 .31 .17
Age (A) 472 21 95 61.78 13.27
Gender (G) 476 1 (Fe) 2(M) 1.74 .44
Beliefs regarding the causes of climate change (CC.B.) 445 1 5 2.55 1.37
Beliefs regarding the causes of the drought (D.B.) 479 0 (O) 1(CC) .26 .441
Political orientation (Po.O.) 454 0 (O) 1(Co) .76 .43
Risk perception on oneself  (Self) 443 0 4 2.12 1.09
Risk perception on family (Fa) 440 0 4 2.20 1.12
Risk perception on agricultural community (Ag) 443 0 4 2.43 1.19
Risk perception on the U.S. (U.S.) 437 0 4 2.33 1.22
Risk perception on the industrialized wealthy nations 
(W.N). 
437 0 4 2.18 1.26
Risk perception on the least wealthy nations (L.W.N.) 438 0 4 2.30 1.37
Risk perception on future generation (Gn.) 436 0 4 2.27 1.39
Risk perception on plants and animals or ecology (Eco) 439 0 4 2.26 1.31
Willingness to increase the amount of insulation (In) 479 0 1 .59 .49
Willingness to install energy-efficient light bulbs (E.L.) 479 0 1 .60 .49
Willingness to plant and grow  more trees (Tr.) 479 0 1 .53 .50
Willingness to use public transportation more (Trans) 479 0 1 .09 .29
Willingness to use more fuel efficient vehicles (E.Ve.) 479 0 1 .53 .50
Willingness to do nothing  479 0 1 .13 .34
Support of developing renewable energy resources 
(R.En.) 
479 0 1 .68 .47
Support of education the public about climate change 
(Ed) 
479 0 1 .33 .47
Support of imposing taxes on industries (T.Ind.) 479 0 1 .15 .36
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Support of imposing taxes on fossil fuels (T.Fu.) 479 0 1 .10 .30
Support of imposing taxes on citizens (T.Ci.) 479 0 1 .03 .16
Support of pressuring car companies to increase fuel 
efficiency (Fu.E.) 
479 0 1 .41 .492
Support of  pressuring the U.S. to ratify international 
protocols (Pr.) 
479 0 1 .16 .372
Support of  using marker incentives to reduce industrial 
emissions (Mar.) 
479 0 1 .28 .450
Support of doing nothing 479 0 1 .17 .379
Fe means female 
M means male 
O means others 
Co means conservative 
CC means climate change 
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